Show simple item record Wooders, Myrna H. Page, Frank H. Jr. 2009-03-24T13:50:24Z 2009-03-24T13:50:24Z 2009-02-24
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a noncooperative game of network formation and identify conditions on network formation rules and players' network payoffs sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function. Our sufficient conditions on network formation rules require that each player be choose freely and unilaterally those clubs he joins and also his activities within these clubs (subject to his set of feasible actions). We refer to our conditions on rules as noncooperative free mobility. We also require that players' payoffs be additively separable in player-specific payoffs and externalities (additive separability) and that payoff externalities - a function of club membership, club activities, and crowding - be identical across players (externality homogeneity). We then show that under these conditions, the noncooperative game of club network formation is a potential game over directed club networks and we discuss the implications of this result. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2009-005 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries CAEPR Working Papers en
dc.relation.isversionof This paper is also available on SSRN and RePEc. en
dc.subject admissible set en
dc.subject Nash club equilibria en
dc.subject path dominance core en
dc.subject potential games en
dc.subject network formation games en
dc.subject clubs en
dc.subject CAEPR en
dc.subject Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research en
dc.title Endogenous Network Dynamics en
dc.type Working Paper en

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