

**LOCAL AND IMPERIAL DISCOURSE IN  
THE REGIONAL MASS PRINT MEDIA OF THE  
TSARIST RUSSIAN FAR EAST 1898 – 1899**

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REEI MA Essay Abstract:

By 1900, in a moment of international crisis, Russians saw themselves as a people under siege rather than as subjects of an empire under siege by the “Yellow Peril.” This shift in attitudes of Russians towards themselves and their Northeast Asian neighbors represents an empire-wide social revolution, a visible transformation of Prudkogliad’s “values orientation” that, in a different context, presaged the 1917 Revolution. Russianness centralizing race and ethnicity over the Tsarist political and class hierarchy. Connected with violence committed by Russians against non-Russian populations throughout the empire in the same period, this revolution merits as much attention as the political revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

This essay examines the transformation of the Russian media and the discourses that influenced the public sphere, to describe how Russians under Tsarism saw themselves and their non-Russian neighbors. Using Fairclough *Critical Language Analysis* of selected news items from the regional Russian Far East press, and preceding discursive trends in literature and the printed mass media of European Russia, this essay describes a significant shift from Russians identifying themselves as Russian subjects to Russian nationals, through their relationship with non-Russians.

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## 1 Introduction

Northeast Asia in the century between 1850 and 1950 was a region of historical high drama, of international and civil wars, revolution and counterrevolution, of new beginnings and chaotic endings affecting individuals and empires. The story of empire in Northeast Asia has been analyzed thoroughly, but its inhabitants have only been to a lesser degree. Reaching the Russian and Chinese communities that settled in Northeast Asia originating in the imperial centers of European Russia and Qing-era China proper is a difficult task. Sources to examine perceptions of the common Russian or Chinese are rare. However, local mass print media offer a voluminous source to examine what public discourses were available to agree or disagree with, to be interested or disinterested in. This is not to say that newspapers are reliable historical narrators of local life, or perfect or even skillful articulators of public opinion or interest. They do inarguably present a range of conversations on all matters of local life. The following is an examination of the Russian-language mass print media produced in the Russian Far East.

In examining this large body of work, two questions need to be answered. What is so Russian about the Russian Far East, and what does the Russian Far East mean in terms of the larger Tsarist Empire? Defining the “Russianness” of the Russian Far East print media requires defining how Russian print media developed throughout the nineteenth century, and how Russians had articulated perceptions of themselves and non-Russian subjects of the Tsar and by what standards the former differentiated themselves from the latter. The rapid modernization of the Tsarist empire changed notions of “Russianness” in both its European and Asian halves

prompted by changes in how information was framed and the frequency with which it was consumed by technological change in the mass print media.

The Russian Far East was a distant peripheral space of the Tsarist Empire, although massive infrastructure investments by land and sea brought Russia's Pacific littoral much closer to Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. Concurrently, a Russian Far East regional consciousness was emerging, brought on by the clashing interests of the center and the periphery with regards to priorities for investment, shifting central interest from Vladivostok and Khabarovsk to Harbin and Dalian, and catastrophic policy failure that ended with the 1905 Russian defeat in the war with Japan. However much policy interests diverged between center and periphery, ideological trends of Russian self-perception were accepted just as much in the Russian Far East as in European Russia. This is most visible in the response of the mass print media to the violent Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, in which Asian populations were increasingly demonized as the "Yellow Peril" that existentially threatened Russia. Although the two regions emphasized different aspects of the perceived racial crisis, they both adapted similar discourses that revealed a drastic change in Russian self-perception as subjects of the Tsar to a European nation.

This analysis of the Russian Far East mass print media begins with a literature review of how the Russian Far East has been written about. The Russian Far East was annexed from the Qing dynasty by treaties in 1858 and 1860. In the twilight of both empires, the demarcated boundaries between the two polities were ineffectual, and the diplomatic settlement between the two states was ignored by the millions of Russian and Chinese settled in the region in pursuit of their own livelihoods. From the second half of the nineteenth century onward, the

Russian sense of self and perceptions of the non-Russian “Other” had been established by decades of conflict and subjugation in the Caucasus, mediated through literature and increasingly through scientific inquiry, a tradition that would inform the Russian experience in Northeast Asia. Finally, the form of the Russian mass press, as developed in the center, was replicated in the Russian Far East. An examination of all these historical trends informs the analysis of the use of discourse in the regional press, to parse what discursive framings and ideologies were used to shape information that was produced and consumed locally by Russians. In the long dramatic Northeast Asian arc of 1850 and 1950, there is a quiet period of roughly eighteen months in which international borders had been settled, and the attention of the international media was distracted from events in Northeast Asia. The articles selected below are from that period, 1898 and 1899, in which locally-produced framings are less encumbered by engagement with extra-regional discourse.

## **2.A Literature Review Russia and “the East” in the Nineteenth Century**

The nineteenth century was a period of dynamic change for the Russian empire, especially with regard to its relationship to Asia. It expanded southward into the Caucasus early in the century, and in the second half of the nineteenth century into what is now the Russian Far East and shortly after Central Asia. Following the annexation of Outer Manchuria, thereafter the Russian Far East, from the Qing dynasty, the Great Reforms of Tsar Alexander II, however imperfectly, drastically reshaped Russian society by removing certain *soslovie* privileges, bestowing new rights, in an effort to promote modernization in all fields of social life. This was followed by increasing reaction against these reforms. Regardless of the resistance to change, the reforms took root in promoting change, even if their political effects were limited. While

the main subject for examination is the communities of the Russian Far East at the very end of the nineteenth century, it is profitable to trace the broad trends that defined the changing relationship of Russians with the newly acquired subjects of the empire, and the changing nature of Russianness in the twilight of the empire.

Rieber finds that the modernization of the empire drastically influenced the, composition, loyalties, and relationships of the imperial elite. This transformation was prompted by the development and growing importance of mass opinion, which was increasingly articulated in the mass media as the century progressed. As access to education improved and barriers to social mobility weakened, elites came to practice politics not by closed caste loyalties but with increasing loyalty to the *narod*, the people (354). While pre-modern social forms didn't die out, (366) they recast elite society to be increasingly "sedimentary," so that while mass politics, however constrained politically, sat atop older political hierarchies of loyalty to the Tsar, and old political and social imperatives mixed with the new. (371-2, 375) The "sedimentary society" of the elites was not replicated to such a degree in the peasantry, who were less affected by currents of social change. That is, while Russian society was transformed, elite culture was more "vulnerable" to social change than the population at large, and accordingly, the relationship between nominally Russian East and West changed more for elites, the ruling government official and shapers of public opinion, than for the common people who abided by the laws and consumed information.

The preceding eighteenth century saw the Russian Empire conquer the Eurasian steppe, which would later serve as a stepping stone for further expansion east and south in the nineteenth century. Beyond changing the geographical dimensions of the empire,

Khodarkovsky notes that the tsarist experience on the steppe transformed the state's relationship to its non-Russian subjects. European notions of Enlightenment, Rationality, and racialization were imported into Russia and readapted for the conquered steppe. The effect was that native populations of the steppe, in the imagination of the Russian administration, were transformed into savages. While Khodarkovsky claims the nature of the Russian empire on the steppe – still connected to the metropole by land, organized and administered by the state rather than (state-sanctioned) trading concerns – differentiates the Tsarist experience on the steppe from Western European precedent in the New World, they operated similarly. Slezkine's study of the relationship between Russians and the "small peoples of the north" showed that, despite seismic changes in the political or social configuration of the Russian (and Soviet) state and its professed attitudes to non-Russian communities, native northerners had always been treated as outsiders. (387-388) Russian peasants and cossacks had, like their Chukchi neighbors, extended social agency to members of their own communities, acknowledging that strangers to their community also lived by and were subjected to foreign customs and social expectations. They lived in separate worlds according to separate social expectations. It was not until "Western Russians' who believed in universal values and equality" changed this status quo, having "a problem with diversity and with the moral double standard that it implied." The result was that instead of Russians and non-Russians living in separate social worlds, according to separate social customs, the state attempted to universalize the experience, with the Russians being judged as the standard to which non-Russian northern peoples, living differently, were treated as inferiors, akin to a "permanent childhood."



Kazan, the first extra-European conquest of the Tsars, was the center in its efforts to assimilate non-Russians through conversion to Orthodox Christianity. In Geraci's study of the missionary activities carried out there in the nineteenth century, from which time until World War I was a period in which "social identities" were "open to redefinition," (6) he notes there was increasing interest from the Russian reading public about non-Russian communities in the empire that followed the development of the mass press and the adoption of universal conscription. Kazan specifically was a multicultural city served by a hinterland that was divided by Russian and Tatar influences, and a general distrust was rooted in the economic and social similarities of the two peoples (3-5). The efforts of the Orthodox seminarians in the city over the course of the nineteenth century were met with resistance by officials and the wider public, as official designations of Russianness ebbed and flowed, as numerous competing versions of Russianness combined different notions of what Russianness was open to which markers of identity were open for adoption or rejection (344). By the end of the century, "Russian" was an ethnic identity that was marked by "permanent separateness" from assimilated non-Russians (350). This was rooted in an "ethnic exclusivity in the racial sense," present "but rarely verbalized by officialdom" and was "undoubtedly" held by the peasantry also; this "ethnic exclusivity" gained prominence as Orthodoxy diminished as a signifier of political reliability. (347-350) As the political stability of the empire deteriorated as the century advanced, in moments of chaos Russian officialdom reacted with an "instinct for separating East and West."

The course of the nineteenth century represents an emerging status quo spurred on by political and geographic realities, the Great Reforms and territorial expansion. The Russian elite was changing, as a new layer of "sedimentary" identity brought on by modernization began to

shift the center of political gravity from service to the Tsar to the *narod*. The parameters of what defined “Russianness” were disputed, but by the end of the century, it was more firmly rooted in racial or ethnic definitions than confessional, and Russian and non-Russian identities were becoming “permanently separate.”

## **2.B Literature Review The Russian Far East**

The Russian Far East, as its name suggests, was a peripheral region of the Tsarist empire. Remnev describes the imperial center-periphery relationship as a “geography of power,” in which the center endeavors to maintain not only material but also ideological control of the periphery. (427-434) The center expressed its will through efforts, centered in the “peripheral cities,” by the state to integrate the Russian Far East politically and economically and also to promote social, judicial, administrative, and demographic uniformity. Scientific expeditions sponsored by the Imperial Russian Geographic Society, associated with and typically led by military officers, was a kind of imperial reconnaissance of the region. The Russian Far East was “structured” spatially by the center with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and its flow of trade dictated by the establishment and disestablishment of customs and tariff regimes. (436-439) Notions of “Russianness” were heightened when Russians came into contact with the Asian “Other,” in which cultural differences between Great, Little, and White Russians were comparatively diminished. (440-444) While the imperial center saw Russia as being delineated by the presence of “Russian plows,” they were also frightened by the possibility that Asian cultural influence would challenge the Russianness of their peasant brethren, their migration serving to push Europe further into Asia and to serve as a “bulwark” against the “yellow race.”

The settlement of the Russian Far East was influenced by the long history of Manchuria, now Northeast China, under the administration of the Qing state. Manchuria was administered by the banner system, a military-political institution that perpetuated a military caste of hereditary bannermen, drawn from Manchus, Mongols, Han Chinese, and various local tribesmen (Lee 39) that oversaw a tributary system in which local peoples were designated as “hunters” and charged with providing certain quantities of regular presentations of furs to the Qing court. This economic-political network legitimized Qing rule and gave the local peoples access to the bannermen caste system. The “hunter” designation represented an economic role in the tributary system, “not a way of life;” this was part of a larger Qing imperial discourse in which the people of the Manchurian tributary system were expected to live according to certain puritanical, natural moral standards. (Schlesinger 65, 168) This central imperative for the Qing Manchurian periphery is similar to the Russian reduction of the northern peoples to a perpetual childhood, and broader efforts of the Russian center to maintain material and ideological control over its periphery

The Qing tributary system was challenged by the increasing settlement of what became the Russian Far East following its annexation in middle of the century. Already by the 1820s, the fur tribute to the Qing court began to involve the market at Khabarovsk, part of an increasingly global, interconnected market (Schlesinger 4, 137). This was linked with the Qing center’s attempts to decrease tribal groups autonomy (Lee 42), and in the middle of the century, to liberalize Han Chinese migration into Manchuria, which like Russian trends across the Amur river, by exiles, and then by peasants. (78-79) The population of the two Russian-adjacent provinces of Qing Manchuria, Heilongjiang and Jilin, and grown from a combined 550,000 in the

second-half of the nineteenth century to 5.57 million by 1907. The Manchurian environment allowed for Han Chinese migrants to live outside increasingly weakened Qing authority, profiting from rich natural resources or banditry; famously, the Zheltuga Republic was established shortly after annexation in 1862, a small, independent gold-mining polity composed of immigrant Russians and Chinese, which took the Qing states until 1889 to decisively disestablish (87, 92-93).

Russian encroachment on Qing Manchuria after the 1860 annexation was resumed in the 1890s, as both Russian and Han Chinese migration to Manchuria and the Russian Far East accelerated. Quested's *"Matey Imperialists"* examined the relationships between Russian and Chinese communities in Qing Manchuria, and found that Russian settlement held "a practical disadvantage" compared to Chinese, in all matters but "material superiority" which was "less solid than [it] seemed," that is, the "geography of power" was tilted against the Russian presence in Qing-administered Manchuria. (11-13) This extended to the inferiority of Russian peasant agricultural practices, and Chinese cultural chauvinism compared to the Russian sense of nationalism that understood itself as only one unique culture among many. These self-conceptions predicated "appalling possibilities for misunderstanding and annoyance" between Russians and Chinese. (13-15) Quested describes Russian and Chinese at odds culturally, specifically over differing values of emotional openness and manners, and general "attitudes of the two nations to women, to animals, to homosexuality, to alcohol, to opium, to military service, to charitable obligation, to legal procedure and many other things." These attitudes were gleaned from observations of elite life, which Quested transposes to non-elites. This leads to the conclusion that "the outlook for inter-ethnic social harmony was to be bleak indeed."

Beyond the gulf in cultural attitudes between the two people, Quested describes the economic and political realities of Russian-desired, Qing-administered Manchuria as being conducive to Russo-Chinese relations was the economic benefit of Russian investment in the region for working Chinese and “modernity in all its aspects” (14-15), and for Russians, their Manchurian interlude offered them a “stage for the display of their Russianness.” Beyond concluding that Qing Manchuria had always been too large for Russia to integrate politically and economically before the disastrous Russo-Japanese War (1894-1896), Russian imperialism in that period had differed substantially from European imperial attitudes, and that that war had been a turning point for relations between Russians and Asians in the Russian Far East and Manchuria (327-331). Before the Russian interlude in Northeast Asia, Russian colonialism was similar to the Spanish and Portuguese experiences in the New World, motivated by “intolerant Christianity” and conquest<sup>1</sup> The Tsarist advance into Central Asia and in the Russian Far East, starting in the middle nineteenth century, was more similar to “early British and Dutch imperialism” in which “merchant adventurers” mixed with local men and women, maintaining unequal physical relations with local women, and marked by its “corruption and exploitation ... low degree of religious motivation, remarkable alcoholism, and lack of government control.” The Sino-Russian relationship before the Russo-Japanese War was “reminiscent of 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century British and Dutch penetration of India and Indonesia.” It is only after the Russo-Japanese War that Russians “began to show signs of assuming the racial aloofness which accompanied the stage of full-fledged Western imperialism” defined by a “tightly drawn,

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<sup>1</sup> Khodorkovsky also identified a Spanish-Muscovite savior complex in Russia’s conquest of the steppe in the previous century. (2-3)

middle class color bar.” For Quested, the Russian experience in Manchuria and Central Asia was the same as the larger European imperial experience but compressed into a few decades what had taken “250 years to run its course in the British and Dutch empires.” Modernization fully expressed itself in redefining not only Russians’ conception of themselves but also their conception of empire as an institution and in their relationship with non-Russians.

Quested identifies the Russo-Japanese War as a decisive turning point in Russia’s relationship with and attitudes toward Asians. Conversely, Glebov identifies an official, imperial trend starting in the 1860s that strove to segregate or expel Chinese from the Russian Far East. These Russian attitudes were inspired by American and European policies toward Chinese. (88-90) This was in part motivated by the military administration of the region, which saw Chinese as being tied to the Qing state (96-97), and perceptions of subjecthood being increasingly grounded in race and “civilizational competence; the result was that Chinese were initially allowed to become subjects of the Tsar, an “outright unique” occurrence in the Empire’s relations with any populations within its territory. This preoccupation of the center was not matched by the regional Russian Far Eastern administration, which lacked sufficient information to enact policy. However, while the policies of the center went unenacted because of administrative weakness, “mental maps” from the Western Borderlands translated Russian anti-Semitism into distrust of Chinese populations, Chinese becoming “Jews of the Far East” (114-115).<sup>2</sup> European merchants enjoyed the privileges of Russian subjecthood without citizenship that was not extended to Chinese, even though Chinese population of Vladivostok

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<sup>2</sup> Stephan also notes that Koreans were also denigrated by Russian as “yellow yids” for the competitiveness of their agriculture (76).

were essentially the “town-dwellers estate” (118-119). While these unequal conditions of subjecthood were later rectified, and segregating policies abandoned, they still maintained an environment that demonized Chinese populations in the Russian Far East (127-128).

While Quested centers the analysis of *“Matey Imperialists”* in Qing-administered Manchuria, Zatsopine argues that the difference between the Russian Far East and Manchuria were actually minimal, and that Russian and Chinese Northeast Asia, viewed not as imperial territory but as a geographical space, the Amur River Basin, shows the weakness of rival imperial influences and the strength of regional life (9, 16), that is, Quested’s observations are applicable beyond the immediate environs Manchuria. Population growth in the Russian Far East, like that in Manchuria, was explosive. 500,000 settlers from the Russian Empire arrived before the Revolution, 200,000 between 1882 and 1907, a majority of which were Ukrainian. After 1878, 200,000 Chinese also entered the Russian Far East. Like Quested, Stephan describes the Sino-Russian relationship as complicated, showing that both violence and cooperation were normal, (73-74) that assimilation and marriage continued until World War I. Chinese merchants and laborers were vital to the regional economy, managing trade in the urban centers, importing labor beginning in the 1890s, composing a majority of gold miners in the Amur region by 1915, the vast majority of Vladivostok shipyard workers by 1900, and made up “almost all unskilled labor” on the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the Ussuri and Amur railroads. The difficult terrain of the region hampered regional development but also made the imperial borders “superficial,” and the region should rather be seen as a “fluid, porous frontier.” Stephan draws similar conclusions, noting that the Cossacks charged with guarding the border actually depended on Chinese smuggling (73). The Russian entrance into Manchuria did create regional

tensions between Vladivostok and Harbin-Dalian, when the Chinese Eastern Railroad was completed in 1901, and the free trade regime in Vladivostok ended in 1900 to spur trade in Russian Dalnii (72, 86).

The history of the Russian Far East is most notably marked by the weakness of central, imperial administration in the periphery, whether its implementing law in the imperial jurisdiction or creating a meaningful border. Official and popular xenophobia and transposed anti-Semitism from the Western Borderlands sat alongside assimilation and inter-communal cooperation and economic dependence. The changing relationship of Russian communities to non-Russians represented a parallel, compressed imperial history as it was experienced by Western European societies, as central political control was followed by the tightening of color lines between European and Asian communities. This transformation of Russian attitudes is a result of the modernization of discursive and ideological practices.

### **3 Methodology Discourse and Ideology**

In Fairclough's *Language and Power*, the author describes his "critical language study" (CLS) methodology, which he advocates using to "explain existing conventions as the outcome of power relations and power struggle." (2) This methodology is interested in the "connection between language, power and ideology," (5) and more specifically "to show up the ... generally hidden determinants [of linguistic elements] in the system of social relationships, as well as hidden effects they may have upon that system." That is, CLS is interested in the dialectical relationship between language and society, wherein language is and linguistic phenomena are kinds of social phenomena, and social phenomena are in part linguistic phenomena, and how this dialect is essentially tied to the expression of power. (22-23) Fairclough defines discourse as



“language as social practice determined by social structures” and that “actual discourse is determined by socially constituted orders of discourse, sets of conventions associated with social institutions.” (17) That is, discourse is a process of social interaction in which recognizable social conventions condition how actors engage one another; actual discourse is the deployment and understanding of social actions by members of a social interaction. Applied to the locally-produced and consumed print media of the Russian Far East, what Russians are reading is what defines the range of actions that define what Russianness is, and this essence of Russianness provides the wide array of discursive options available to Russians to express themselves. The objects of analysis later in this paper can be defined as Russian discourse.

Moving beyond the goals of CLS, Fairclough’s methodology is composed of several interlocking processes of defining aspects in the relationship between language and society, which is the dissemination and utilization of discourse. CLS has three stages of analysis: *description* which is concerned with the formal properties of a text (spoken, written, etc.); *interpretation* which is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction; and *explanation*, which is concerned with the relationship between interaction and social context.

(26) This tripartite framework of analysis sorts linguistic and social phenomena into a hierarchical structure in which the range of employable “actual discourse” are made contingent on a “discourse type,” for which in turn the deployable range of are made contingent on a “discursive order.” (28-30) Discursive orders are interdependent networks, meaning that discourse types and actual discourse do not exclusively belong to one discursive order, and that multiple discursive orders can be drawn upon simultaneously.

The tripartite analytical model of *description, interpretation, and explanation* is used to identify and define the three levels of the hierarchy of discourse: actual discourse, discourse types, and discursive orders. With defined segments of the language-society dialectic, it is possible to understand the nature of how power is expressed in society. Power is defined as the ability for one to choose which discourse types are to be used when engaging in (actual) discourse (31). Functionally, power is expressed in order to “control and constrain the contributions of non-powerful participants,” specifically the content in discourse, the relationship between actors, and subject positions, the latter defining one’s role as being an actor or audience in discourse. (46-47) The exercise of power in choosing types of discourse and the resulting use of actual discourses, owing to the essential dialectical relationship between language and society, changes the nature of the order of discourse(s) in which power is exercised. Effectively, the deployment of social power can only be completely understood when the social-linguistic dialectic that informs it is also understood.

Employing an analytical model based on CLS on the articles below is a way of defining and contrasting how power is exercised in the Russian Far East, and on another level, how those incidences of power struggle are mediated in the press. The range of discursive orders and discursive types that dictate how the press mediates local events is more limited than the array of discursive orders and types that dictate how the locals under examination in this paper negotiated their lives in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Therefore, each news article under analysis requires two levels of analysis, of the event as an object in itself and also as a mediated object by the press.

The goal of employing Fairclough's Critical Language Study is to find trends of actual discourse as they are employed in different discursive orders and discourse types. Trends in the use of actual discourse can be described by what Stuart Hall defines as ideology. (31) For Hall, ideology is the full range of "images, concepts, and premises which provided the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand, and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence." Functionally, ideology is a practice in which concepts are combined that create positions of identity and knowledge within which individuals are able to formulate intentions (31-33). Ideological struggle is "an intervention in an existing field of practices and institutions; those which sustain the dominant discourses of meaning and society" (33-34). That is, Hall's ideology and ideological struggle are respectively the arena and the means in which Fairclough's orders and types of discourse are challenged and redefined through changing combinations of actual discourse.

Further, Hall claims that the "media's main sphere of operations is the production and transformation of ideologies," through producing "representations of the social world, images, descriptions, explanations and frames for understanding how the world is and why it works as it is said and shown to work." (34-35) Hall's framework for examining ideology is specifically interested in ideologies of race in the media, wherein it is "not only a powerful source of ideas about race. They are also the one place where these ideas are articulated, worked on, transformed, and elaborated." Race relations had been constructed along three discursive axes: "fixed relations of subordination and domination," "stereotypes grouped around the poles of 'superior' and 'inferior' natural species," and "both were displaced from the 'language' of history into the language of Nature."

These racial attributions informed discourse that produced a “grammar of race,” marked by the invisible “imperializing ‘white eye’” that defined the author’s position in demonstrating their inferred “moral, social, and physical mastery of the colonizers over the colonized” (38-39). Hall describes the stereotypes that have persisted in the “grammar of race” into late-twentieth-century Britain, which can be thought of as actual discourse in racist discursive orders. Those stereotypes are broadly that of the “slave,” “native,” “mammie,” and “entertainer.” (39-41) These stereotypes broadly reduce the objects of racist ideology as being only a part of “an anonymous collective mass,” concealing their treachery behind assurances of childlike devotion, as objects of humor or physicality for their colonizer audience, all of which point to a “primitivism” that is defined by their innate connection to nature. This “grammar of race,” a part of a larger racist ideology, allows for power to be expressed under racist discursive orders, deploying stereotypes so that “race is constructed as a *problem* and the site of *conflict* and debate” (43), which allows for “precipitating conditions of conflict” to be avoided (44). Those “precipitating conditions of conflict” being the highly-contingent course of history that allowed for European, profit-driven transgression throughout the world against states temporarily destabilized: specifically in this study, the annexation of Outer Manchuria by the Tsarist empire in the nineteenth-century during a period of Qing state failure rather than in earlier centuries when that state was resilient and the Tsarist empire was unable to make its demands met. Effectively, the development and utilization of a racist ideology shifts discursive orders from discussing the morality and legality of the Russian annexation – a legal discursive order – to framing this event in terms of “Russia’s special civilizing mission,” a racist discursive order that implies Russian natural supremacy over non-European populations.

Fairclough's critical language study is a methodology to illuminate discursive hierarchical structures that can be identified in the linguistic-social dialectic. This discursive hierarchy is then used to show how the linguistic-social dialectic encodes meaning to the spectrum of deployable actual discourse, and how actual discourse, once deployed, alters the spectrum of deployable actual discourse by redefining the limits of this spectrum or the meaning of actual discourse. Hall's description of ideology is identifiable trends in how actual discourse is deployed and how power is systematically expressed to favor certain discursive orders. Together, analyzing and identifying discursive hierarchical structures and ideologies of the Russian media landscape, and specifically the Russian Far East media as its subset, can illuminate how "Russianness" and "Chineseness" were constructed and sold to Russian information consumers.

#### **4.A Literature Review Russian Media in the Nineteenth Century**

The development of mass print media in the Tsarist empire throughout the nineteenth-century was inextricably tied to its societal modernization. For McReynolds, the newspaper itself is "the story of political, social, cultural, and economic transformation" (3). Russia's "lost middle classes" (5) were the medium's key beneficiaries, as consumers of an information commodity, and producers in a new industry that offered upward social mobility. For the middle-classes politically, the press as an institution, "subverted the continuation of absolutism" by "increasing the public's role in political decision-making," grounded in discursive orders of "specifics of time and detail and the growing importance of facticity." (7) In practice this meant that as the century progressed, journalism challenged the public role of the intelligentsia; for McReynolds the role of journalists was "recording details and conversations rather than interpreting for readers" as was the role of the intelligentsia, the former

“stimulating readers to think of themselves as actors in the world unfolding around them ... encourag[ing] aspirations among readers to influence the course of events” (165), the latter writing authoritative interpretations of facts. The history of the Russian press in the nineteenth century attests to an increase in individual intellectual autonomy for Russian print consumers towards both consuming and interpreting one’s relationship to the world through the journalistic ideology of facticity, rather than consuming and interpreting one’s relationship to the world through the curated philosophy of the intelligentsia.

This gradual change in information commodities from mediation courtesy of the intelligentsia to a journalistic-positivist style conducive to personal interpretation can be framed as a transformation of discursive orders prompted by technological and institutional developments, which were accelerated by resultant market forces. By the 1890s, “technological opportunities,” the telegraph, the presence of faster and more reliable transportation and delivery infrastructure, and improvements in printing efficiency and quality (including image reproduction), allowed publishers “to adapt contents to the differing tastes of their increasingly heterogenous audiences, as well as to distribute their papers more quickly and more widely” (123). These “heterogenous audiences” encouraged publishers to market fact-based stories, but in arrangements that fit the perspectives of their audiences. In reporting on scandalous murder trials, “commentaries on the killers emphasized the differences in the coverage,” some papers noting “the killers were educated, had options for employment, and had murdered for the sense of exhilaration” to prove a point that “social morals were in sad and dangerous decline.” (138) Conversely, other papers “focused on the atmosphere of the court, the crowd of thrill-seeking women who ‘treated the affair as an adventure story by popular French novelist

Pondon du Terrail.” The commemoration of Pushkin in 1887 was “appropriated by six different readerships,” and publishers, “in as many ways” (139-141). The 1895 murder trial of Olga Palem, “a mentally unstable Jewess” was framed not only as a scandalous crime of passion, she was accused of “killing the man who jilted her,” but was also reported on through distinct discursive orders of religion, medicine, sexuality, and the law (141-142).

The increasing ability of the Russian mass print media to provide a widening spectrum of news coverage and framings represents an expansion of the range of discursive orders available to Russian audiences, and a resultant widening of possible discursive ideologies. Specifically, with regard to the murder trial of Olga Palem, Russian audiences had the possibility to engage with and formulate their own opinion on the subject in discursive orders that framed the facts of this incident according to proto-psychological theory, the “Woman Question,” the configuration of the court system, and so on. The ways in which the press made use of a wide range of discursive orders to frame the presentation of their fact-rich reporting not only drew attention to how the court would judge Palem’s case, but the press also disseminated ideologies and evoked an ideological response from its audience, such as believing her guilt or innocence is derived from her religion, gender, health, or her alleged crime. That is, although Russian journalism was able to evade the perceived constrictive interpretation of the intelligentsia media, the mass press still sold their reading public the news that required consuming and reacting to fact-based reporting in set discursive orders of medicine, religion, sexual politics, etc. which prompted ideological readings and responses, whether or not the reader agreed or disagreed. The developments of the Russian press throughout the nineteenth

century are broadly the response to and stimulation of an expanding and fragmenting reading audience and the growing complexity and diversity of discursive orders and ideological struggle.

The course of Russian print media in the nineteenth century, of the growth in the variety of employed discursive orders and an attendant wide range for the use and transformation of ideologies, can be compared with the course of popular Russian writing on the Caucasus. Russian writing about the Caucasus throughout the nineteenth century shares major trends with Russia's mass print media, and in examining a genre of media rather than a medium writ large, it is possible to describe discursive and ideological trends with greater specificity. The Russian literary Caucasus was "essentially a cultural monologue," an intra-Russian discursive space, "which transmitted and reproduced itself from one epoch to another in various genres – in fiction and non-fiction, in the canonical and the 'low'" (Layton 8-9). Further, the Caucasus, as a literary subject, is the most richly covered borderland, the archetypal frontier of the Russian literary canon, and as such, provides the largest sample to draw conclusions about how Russian media discussed its borderlands over the same period as the modern Russian press. For Layton, across the nineteenth century, Russian writers discussing the Caucasus can be organized along a spectrum of support or disapproval for "the state's imperial agenda." (6, 9-11) Tolstoy's posthumously-published *Hadji Murat* is representative of the pole of Russian literature that interpreted Russian expansion in the Caucasus as "vile aggression." Situated on the polar opposite in support of the Tsarist advance into the Caucasus are the "little orientalizers," who produced a "body of second-rate and purely hack literature" which "entertained no doubts about the boundaries between Russia and Asia." (156) These authors in the 1830s were "intent upon demonstrating the Caucasus' savage alterity ...



asserting what Russians were *not*.” In between the humanistic writings of late Tolstoy and the “hack literature” of the little orientalizers are the Caucasus writings of Pushkin and Lermontov. Their early works of “ephemeral orientalia” “underwrote” the annexation of Georgia by “marginaliz[ing] it as a ‘little corner of Asia forgotten by Europe’ and awaiting Russian overlords,” while their later works complicated the boundary between Russians and the peoples of the Caucasus. By constructing the tribes of the literary Caucasus as a formidable opponent of the Russian military, authors “dissolved the boundaries between Russia and Asia,” and in equating the belligerents made the violence “culturally non-specific ‘savagery’” and “degraded the tsarist conquest,” marring the campaigns’ “moral justification as a civilizing mission” (10).

Layton’s two poles encapsulating the spectrum describing the Russian literary Caucasus represent proclivities between two discursive ideologies: an ideology of race, a forerunner of that described by Hall, and an ideology of humanism, espoused by Tolstoi. The writings of the “little orientalizers” placed the source of conflict between Russian and Caucasus locals in the latter’s inherent barbarism, the cultural superiority of the former propelling the inevitable Russian triumph. The Tolstoian polar opposite places the source of conflict in the moral failings of the Tsarist state in waging war against common humanity, a barbarism borne of amorality. The works between the poles, of late Pushkin, Lermontov, et al. were the most popular in the nineteenth century, which represented the annexed region as a “romantic Caucasus as an Asia happily accommodated in the semi-Europeanized Russian self,” “a textual realm of intriguingly shifting boundaries between ‘us’ and them’” (254-255). In this cultural monologue, the ideologies Layton maps are perspectives for Russians to understand themselves, specifically for

Russian men, “whose psychological needs it so evidently served” (288) by using the Caucasus and its inhabitants as an orientalized, literary-constructed “Other.” This audience was presented with ideological framings that ranged from presenting them as members of a common humanity who needed to engage with private and public morality, and conversely, presenting the audience as being endowed with an innate European-Russian superiority that required active exhibition among the barbarians.

Much like Russian print media writ large, Russian writing about the Caucasus changed throughout the nineteenth century as a result of modernization driven by economic development. “From the 1860s onward, the volume of published documents, history, ethnography and statistics about the dominion grew by quantum leaps.” (253) The logical positivism, facticity, and volume emblematic of the modernizing Russian press contended with the earlier romanticism of Pushkin et al to reframe the region from site of valor to development. The 1830s “hack literature” of the little orientalists coincided with the “wide public recognition” of “the territory’s economic potential as a Russian colony.” (157) Layton connects the greater emphasis on the Russian-Caucasus boundary of the little orientalists’ to the “growing awareness of the war’s economic implications.” In Russia’s imagined Caucasus, economic development provided the means to describe the region empirically but also to exaggerate the perceived barbarity of “the Other.” “By the end of the century in Russia, a complete interpenetration of popular history and literature had taken place to form a gigantic imperial epic of European ‘triumph over obstinate barbarism’ in the Caucasus.” (261) That is, the imperative of economic development displaced the blurred boundary between Russian and Caucasian described by Pushkin, for the facticity emblematic of the press and the demonization

of “the Other” by the little orientalists so that economic development and political subjugation of the region could be justified to and supported by the public. Regarding the Caucasus, economic development promoted the deployment of racial ideology to support Russian commercial aims; the longer and earlier Russian engagement with the Caucasus allows for a deeper understanding of how discourses surrounding the region developed.

The transition through time and space from the early nineteenth-century Caucasus to the late nineteenth-century Northeast Asia is to understand the trajectory of the discursive range available to Russians in the Russian Far East. Russians had begun to define themselves by finding and identifying an alien culture, variously framing differences by focusing on their shared humanity or seemingly irreconcilable differences of culture or civilizational destiny. The general trend was towards over-simplification grounded in imperfect facticity that promoted defining oneself in opposition to “the Other.” While McReynolds identifies tendencies in the mass press as a whole to expand its readership as the century progressed, literature had been used conversely to increasingly mark Asia as a space of inferiority destined for Russian aggression as the century continued, with the exception of Tolstoian humanism.

#### **4.B Literature Review Russian Media and “the Far East”**

The Russian tradition of writing about China, and later the Russian Far East itself, began in the seventeenth century by “talented Russian missionaries, officials, and leaders of the Russian spiritual mission in Peking” (Romanenko 10-12). Throughout the nineteenth century, “multivolume books and solid articles about China” were published by Russian authors, and in 1855 the Eastern Faculty of Saint Petersburg University was established which started the “excellent school of Russian Petersburg Orientologists.” The 1860 annexation of the Russian Far

East and the 1896 Russo-Qing agreement to grant Russia the right to build a railroad across Manchuria allowed a “rush into the Far East, Manchuria, and China of numerous Russian state agents, industrialists, writers, scientists and artists.” Writings about the Russian Far East and China grew throughout the course of the nineteenth century, in league with the development of the Russian mass press generally. The Sino-Russian frontier as it was visited by Russians more as the century progressed, was described in discursive orders used in journalism. Romanenko’s list of Russian authors who wrote about China is overwhelmingly populated by what can be classified retroactively as non-fiction writers. The three most-celebrated authors of fiction mentioned in the introduction of *Kitai u Russkikh pisatelei*, Goncharov, Tolstoy, and Chekhov, do not have any fictional works included, and Chekhov’s works are excluded altogether; the cited texts include Goncharov’s *Frigate Pallada*, a travel memoir, and Tolstoy’s “Epistle to members of the world brotherhood to the Chinese people,” an attempt at interfaith dialogue.

The literary Caucasus underwent a definitive transformation of discursive orders and ideologies, as that imagined region changed from being written about by Pushkin and Lermontov as a location of moral equivocation in prose and poetry to a place of imagined rigid boundaries of identities, or as a site of empirical study. Northeast Asia, and the Russian Far East specifically, was not a site for this transformation. The “Other” that inhabited Northeast Asia, the local “hunters,” the disparate urban and rural Chinese communities, the roving bands of *honghuzi*<sup>3</sup> and loose Tsarist exiles were never the objects of the Russian romantic imagination, and if so, decidedly not to the same extent as the peoples of the Caucasus. There is no Chinese

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<sup>3</sup> *Honghuzi* are bandits specific to Manchuria, and transliterated by Russian as *hunhuzi*. Lee (94) identifies the term originating from a period when bandits wore theatrical masks with red beards. Stephan (64) suggests it refers to ‘red-bearded’ Russians who attacked Amur natives in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

equivalent of the literary Shamil who could be imagined by a Russian reader “as a compatriot who had turned his gun against the Tsar” fighting for freedom (Layton 129). The difference between the literary Russian Far East and the literary Caucasus that had served the needs of the Russian male psyche, while empirically different, was not so different as to preclude the transplantation of the romantic prose and poetry of the literary Caucasus in the early nineteenth century to the literary Russian Far East of the middle nineteenth century. What is different is that in the period of heightened Russian interest in Northeast Asia, there had been a substantial transformation in the predilections to deploy discursive orders and ideology. This is in line with how McReynolds and Layton viewed the trajectory of nineteenth century Russian media towards describing the world according to a logical positivist ideology using scientific discursive orders, rather than the interpretative style of the intelligentsia, or the romanticism of Pushkin and Lermontov.

The racial ideology that placed a solid boundary between the “savage” Caucasians and “civilized” Russians found an outlet as the “Yellow Peril” for Russia’s frontier further east. The prevalence of the use of “Yellow Peril” ideological discourses in the Russian press followed incidences of conflict in Northeast Asia; the region was not a popular topic in the metropolitan press without events of significant urgency. The first widespread manifestation of this ideology in the press was during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. In Makarov’s study of the intelligentsia media, he found they reacted by “directly turning to “Yellow Peril” terminology,” behaving with “perplexity ... bordering on panic, [which] was generally uncharacteristic.” (202-204) Journalists, writing about Chinese as individuals or as a social body, “orientalized their essence as representing the ‘backwardness,’ ‘inflexibility,’ and ‘barbarity’ of the East,” communicated

through “quite firmly developed stereotypes in the attitude towards Chinese, as people who were peaceful, weak, and cowardly.” (205) Papers of different political leanings used “Yellow Peril” terminology and “all Russian social-political journals, despite their very sharp ideological views” “were astonishingly unified in negative appraisals of rebels, who were depicted in extremely dark colors.” While the Chinese rebels were condemned for the atrocities they committed, the Russian press “assigned guilt to the bloody occurrences in the Far East, in the first order, on the European powers” who were motivated by “the greed above all of the industrial nations and their unreserved demands and attitudes toward the local population,’ and specifically the ‘intolerance of the Catholic missionaries.’” The Russian critics also “prudently ignored the role in the occurring incidents of Russia.” The metropolitan intelligentsia press ubiquitously combined the two polar opposite ideological discourses Layton found deployed in the Caucasus: the racial, orientalizing ideology that frames discourse in solving the problems arising from the innately barbarian, Asiatic “Other,” and the humanistic ideology of Tolstoy that frames discourse in moralistic terms to condemn the non-Russian European imperialists as corrupted by greed.

In an examination of every 1903 issue of the three largest daily newspapers published in Saint Petersburg, emblematic of the new ideology of facticity, Miliutina found that interest in the Far East was limited in scope, and articles focused on the development of the Trans-Siberian railroad until the Russo-Japanese War, including the possible benefits of further economic ties with Japan, and generally held pro-China orientation. (2) The attitudes of the Petersburg press to the Trans-Siberian railroad were skeptical, concerned about its benefits and “not remaining a monument of a colossal, but fruitless effort.” A majority of the articles

focused on European affairs, with only 10%-15% of issues in any capacity mentioning the Far East, and a majority of them published as the possibility increased of war with Japan at the end of the year (1-2, 5). As the diplomatic situation deteriorated, the daily press increasingly framed the story in the racial, "Yellow Peril" ideology, moving from diplomatic terminology of "question," "problem," "crisis" to "Yellow Peril" and "Japanese chauvinism and the truth of things." (3) Interestingly, Miliutina found that the diplomatic crisis had not been described as possibly heading towards war until it had been written about in that way in the English-language press and then cited in the Russian press. The metropolitan press in 1903 saw the Far East as a place of little economic value, potentially a bad investment, and as mostly newsworthy as a place of external insecurity. In addition to the use of a racial ideology in the moment of crisis, the press normalized the Russian Far East as an economic periphery, a place where money could be spent "fruitlessly," inferring that it may be better spent in the European center.

The Russian Far East did not enter the Russian imagination as the Caucasus did because Russian interest was not drawn to the region before the course of modernization changed discursive and ideological norms. The Russian relationship to the Asiatic "Other" had already been set as confrontational, with Russian civilization and civilizing mission inherently superior and inevitably victorious over Asian dissoluteness. The possibility that the Asiatic "Other" could be a potential equal and ally in the fight for freedom against the Tsar was closed by the arrival of Russian settlers and popular imagination to the Russian Far East; racial ideology framed the Asiatic "Other" as barbarians, and discursive orders framed them as security or economic threats.

#### 4.C Literature Review Russian Far East Regional Media

The print media of European Russia differed from that of the regional Russian Far East in articulating the racial ideological “Yellow Peril” construct. By the late nineteenth century, the actual discourse evoking “Yellow Peril” ideology had formed around four discursive orders: demographic, military, economic, and biological. These discourse types were deployed together and functioned interconnectedly: “fears before massive migration of populations of the Far Eastern states to the West, was a reflection of the danger of Russian society before the military clash of the ‘yellow’ and ‘white’ races” (Guzei 11) potentially resulting in “the decline of European manufacturing, the loss of the colonial mastery of the European states in Asia, and even the danger of the assimilation by the ‘yellows’ of the representatives of the ‘white race’” (24-5). Russians saw “‘the East’ through a prism of racial theory, ... a unity of anthropological integrity – representatives of the ‘yellow race’” and “believed in a ‘yellow world,’ united along biological characteristics by the community of interests and goals” ultimately feeding into an imagined “generalized form of threat from the East, which was already connected not with the different states, but with the entire region and the entire race” (19). Use of “Yellow Peril” framings increased with anti-foreigner sentiment in China (21), the motivating factor of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. These discursive orders are all pseudo-scientific, making use of the same (deeply-flawed) logical-positivist facticity that was becoming en vogue as a result of the empire’s rapid modernization, disseminated through the mass print media. The adoption of scientific language to frame the challenges of the belated, difficult internal development of the Tsarist empire relative to its neighbors both in Europe and Asia, resulted in narratives that demonized the Far East as a regional-racial menace. (3) The race ideology that framed the



insecurity of Russia's borders with China, Korea, and Japan was articulated as the "Yellow Peril," is also very informative as to how Russians saw themselves: "the creation of the enemy is always a 'very autobiographical work,' capable of saying much about one's society."

The metropolitan press<sup>4</sup> wrote about the "Yellow Peril" threat in a "temperate one," viewing Russia as an "integral part of the problem, which was also faced by the United States and Europe," framing it as a "pan-imperial, global" problem that was informed by and in communication with Western perceptions. (20-21, 25) Conversely, the press of the Russian Far East<sup>5</sup> "actively expressed its opinion about the forward conquest of the region, reproaching the local and capital administration in the misunderstanding of the seriousness of their position," "seen through a prism of regional interests, considering it a threat to the national security of the empire." The differing reactions of the central and regional presses reveal significant departures in perspective in discussing a commonly-understood ideological framing. The central press treats the issue as a peripheral, external, and largely theoretical issue: understanding and discussing the "Yellow Peril" in European Russia is to discuss Russia's place among Europe, and how the states of the "white races" are to cooperate in defending their understood shared interests in the political and economic subjugation of the regional-biological "East." The European Russian press was interested in Asia as long as it provided them with opportunities to identify themselves as being European, and this stimulated their desire to treat their territory in Asia as a periphery to the European center. The press in the Russian Far East was concerned with the insecurity of their region, affected by the internal challenges of banditry and externally

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<sup>4</sup> Guzei's study made use of 6 European newspapers, 10 journals, and 3 eparchate newspapers

<sup>5</sup> The Far East newspapers included

by the disintegration of Qing authority and the military aggression of Japan. The regional attitude to Asian neighbors ran parallel to European attitudes, and the significant difference was the consciousness of the region as the site of immediate, violent conflict and commercial competition, rather than as a victim of ambiguous cultural and great power strife. In examining the “Yellow Peril” discourse as it was employed in the Russian Far East, it appears that the region is peripheralizing itself as the distant, local frontier of a besieged, greater European culture. While this racial discourse was used to explain the world around the Russians in the region, it is insufficient to interpret local understandings of the self, as “Yellow Peril” by default peripheralizes the European space of contact with Asia. However much Russians saw themselves as being on a civilizational frontier, far from their (mostly) European points of origin, they also self-identified themselves as residents of the Russian Far East, and however imperfect their environment, it was their home. Though racial ideology discussed through pseudo-scientific discursive orders explained the peripherality of the Russian Far East position, other ideologies of localness need to be examined.

McReynolds identifies nuances in “Yellow Peril” discourse in European Russia. Tsar Nicholas II famously “dismissed the Japanese as short-tailed monkeys,” (193-4) clearly identifying the Japanese, and other Asian communities, as a threat in the regional-racial discursive framing as X identified in the cited analysis above. However, McReynolds finds that although the metropolitan press she surveyed made use of “Yellow Peril” discourse, they did so in a way that demonized Japanese aggression in Asia that threatened Russian ambitions in China and Korea, not the presence of Asian communities as an existential threat to Russia and Europe. This political discursive framing of a nominally racial ideology was motivated by the

metropolitan press' desire to widen the definition of Russianness, to include Asian subjects of the Tsar into a Russian civic nation. Some of the capital papers went so far as to editorialize against the Russo-Japanese War, and to sympathize with the Qing dynasty and the Chinese people against European encroachment, that is, against the political goals inferred from "Yellow Peril" ideology. The deployment of "Yellow Peril" ideology according these two political goals represents a negative construction of national identity as described by Benedict Anderson.

*Imagined Communities* posits that the nation is a constructed identity that finds purchase once the limits of confessional or dynastic identities (6-7) are revealed through popular participation in shared media consumption (46). McReynolds presents an inversion of Anderson's prerequisite decline of dynastic and religious authority before the invigoration of national identity (36), in that the Tsar utilized "Yellow Peril" as a negative imperial and national identifier, while the metropolitan print media used it to exclude Japan from the Russian sense of "Asianness."

Local print media in the Russian Far East "played a leading role in the cultural life of the region," "was constantly and actively spiritedly connected with the local, ... carrying into the court of local societal opinion of all the basics, more than the actual questions of societal life such as the artistic-economic, and thus the cultural-political and spiritual" (Prudkogliad 63). Prudkogliad's analysis of the local press after the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution showed that the local press as an institution generally reported "objectively and independently from its own specific [political] aspirations" (65). The influence of the local press is derived from its ability to disseminate representations of "the actual system of values orientation, that is, culture ... independently from its ideological-political orientation." (7-8) Prudkogliad's "values

orientation,” in frameworks of Fairclough’s discursive hierarchies and Hall’s discursive ideologies, can be thought of as the reader’s ideological point of departure for responding to media. The press actively engaged in covering the “grudge of the day, to the actuality of raising its questions of social life” – that is, on a near daily basis, the press represents the transformation of ideology through the reproduction and interpretation of actual discourse and discursive orders through its reporting on events capable of capturing the imagination of its buying public and larger audience. Being able to report on the “grudge of the day” was a condition of the “adjustment of society, the people, and the government to the quick flow of life,” to the process of modernization that was changing every aspect of Russian life, and society at large so that “societal consciousness, like in the press itself, was concentrated in the immediate, searching for simple and close decisions without taking into account historical experiences.” This new, modern tempo of life altered the range of employable discourse by the reader, by overwhelming them with new information about events covered in the press with increasingly technical and varied discursive orders that made life experience, understood with such different ideologies and discursive orders and at such a different tempo, too different to be applicable to modern life presented by the newspaper. The quickening tempo of news and opportunities to transform and engage in discourse increased the rate at which the public’s “values orientation “changed. Prudkogliad argues that “the shift of priorities in [the] system [of values orientation] expresses a crisis of the situation of society” (7). After 1907 and until the collapse of the Tsarist order, this crisis of social and discursive transformation, the Russian Far East public “perceived and absorbed into its own worldview that general mentality, which was

characteristic of all the press, and for all of society: the negation of the existing governmental structure, the necessity of sharp fundamental change” (67).

The press in the Russian Far East was disseminating information framed by discursive ideologies and orders that were new, and in employing these new ways of describing the world, changed the tempo and the ways in which readers were able to deploy their own lived experiences in engaging with discourse. Modernization was permanently changing the relationship of the reader in all his relations to the world in the possible range of actions, economic, political, and social, by changing the nature of how the reader communicated, not through changing the objects of discussion. Prudkogliad’s “shift of priorities in the system of values orientation” and resultant crisis in the Russian Far East runs parallel to Duara’s articulation of the local in generating authenticity, as an imagined construct, as the “central area of tension in the epochal nexus between nationalism and global capitalism” (13). In Duara’s examination of artistic and political appropriation of the local in the People’s Republic of China in the late twentieth century, the imagined local is produced “as a type of knowledge that temporalizes this space as belonging to another time (different from that of the reader or viewer) ... the authenticity of the local emerges from [...] naturalization of space” in order for it to “become an authentic and enduring object to be investigated, restored, and/or reformed” by a larger formation, nations, markets, etc. (14) The imagined local, as a historicized and imagined object, can then be “incorporated into a system of variations regulated by nationalist ideology.” The imagined local, as a collection of actual discourse, is a range of constituent ideas that informs how discourses of nationality identify members and outsiders. The Russian Far East, as an area of both Russian “locales” and nominally alien populations, a frontier, complicates the

ability of the Russian community to situate their lived experiences as being authentic in a nationalist ideology. Further, it complicates nationalist ideological claims by Russians on the region. In negotiating the Russian “local” in the Russian Far East, which was undeniably a lived fact, together the press and the public had to “shift priorities in the system of values orientation” to either conform with their discursive choices and realities to fit nationalist ideologies, or challenge and temper nationalist ideologies to fit their lived realities. This is undoubtedly a source for Prudkogliad’s “crisis of the situation of society,” not because intercultural contact is by definition a source of conflict, but because modern tempos and discursive hierarchies and ideology delegitimized one’s historical individual or communal experiences. With only the modern discursive orders and ideologies, Russians increasingly saw themselves as different from their Chinese neighbors, and the ingrained importance of one’s Russianness, through the increasing influence of the press in closing the porousness of that identity, made it increasingly difficult for Russians to imagine the Russian Far Eastern local as also being shared with Chinese.

The “Yellow Peril” was a constellation of commonly deployed actual discourse, employed to frame Russia’s relationship to Asia with different ideological goals. Examining how frequently and for what purposes “Yellow Peril” actual discourses are invoked is a method to understand how journalists in the Russian Far East articulated local authenticity and “systems of values orientation.” These articulations show how notions of “Russianness” in the Russian Far East correspond to or challenge larger identity constructions, the national or imperial interpretations of Russian identity.

## **5.A Analysis Introduction**

A general trend in media production of the late Tsarist empire is the transformation of discussing events in print media from being filtered by the intelligentsia, educated elites, through political, philosophical, and literary discursive orders to being marketed by journalists and publishers through the proto-scientific discursive orders through a flawed, logical-positivist discursive framing. The new journalism's fact-centered reporting allowed the consumer, growing in number from rising literacy rates, to fashion their own ideological response within the possible range proffered by the spectrum of discursive orders and ideological modes that were beneficial to understanding society, and through market forces dictating the success of newspapers, themselves became agents of the transformation of discursive ideologies and orders. At a lower level of analysis, newspapers were articulating notions of local authenticity, giving readers a sense of how to understand themselves and their lived spaces discursively, and in turn responding directly to print media or by engaging or disengaging with prescribed social functions discussed in print media. The propensity of local communities to live by expected notions of local authenticity is representative of how reliably the values orientation of society are being communicated and understood not only by the press but local society at large. By closely examining and defining discursive trends in local print media, in this study of the Russian Far East, it is possible to understand how the local defines itself in relation to a larger social formation, the empire, nation, or the world. Further, in dealing with a local and regional media market, it is easier to examine the relationship between media producers and consumers that transformed discourse within their particular understanding of their locality.

The Russian Far East during the tsarist period was in the Russian imagination an insecure frontier. It was the site of conflict, or adjacent to conflict, inter- or intra-state and state-

sanctioned or popular, and military and civil violence. When migration to the region accelerated with improved infrastructure in the 1890s, the region became an arena of increasingly racialized conflict, this sense heightened with the disintegrating authority of the Qing state after the Boxer Rebellion starting in 1899, and the disastrous loss of Tsarist prestige during the Russo-Japanese War and thereafter. These continuous security concerns, drove empire-wide attention to the region as a contested site of “Europeanness” by the “Yellow Peril.” The local authenticity, or inauthenticity, of the region informed and was informed by empire-wide discourse that was also informed by Western conceptions of the “Yellow Peril.” There are only two years, 1898 and 1899, to examine the Russian Far East’s self-conception of local authenticity, its values orientations and the mechanisms of the public transformation and consumption of discursive ideologies and orders without the least intervention of non-local actors, before the deluge of “Yellow Peril” discourses. Beyond the immediate displacement of local discourses with imperial discourses, this two-year period is the only period of Russian optimistic interest in the region before its defeat to Japan, when the Russian Far East was a backwater for news; the Spanish-American and Boer wars were the international “grudges of the day” and Russia’s position in Northeast Asia had been confirmed through treaties with the European great powers, China, and Russia.

Understanding the Russian Far East as a region requires examining how its constituent parts created local authenticity for themselves. Two newspapers from the largest cities of the region, the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* published in Khabarovsk and *Vladivostok* published in that city serve as the discursive spaces for analysis. The *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* was founded in 1893 and was only disestablished with the collapse of the Tsarist



regime in 1917. It was an official newspaper and was printed by the chancellery of the Priamure Governor-General. *Vladivostok* was a privately-owned paper, began publishing in 1882 and was closed in 1906, following the reestablishment of imperial control following the chaos of the Russo-Japanese War. The paper was forced to cease operations as it voiced an “openly democratic orientation” which naturally “called out the prosecution of the state.” (Prudkogliad 49) However, the “creative strength” of the paper found employment with a different publication, “its own content having become a continuation of its predecessor” shortly after closing.

In 1898 and 1899 the *Vladivostok*, on its masthead, described itself as a weekly “societal-literary and maritime newspaper.” A year’s subscription cost 11 rubles, 5 k., an individual issue 30 kopecks, these prices remaining static through 1899.<sup>6</sup> A large space (approximately 1/12<sup>th</sup> of one page) is reserved for explaining how to submit articles, correspondence, and advertisements for publication, and the publisher’s policies for payment, and holding and selection of articles; the use of valuable front-page space for such a prosaic concern points to the popularity or prestige of the newspaper as a public forum. The *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* merely notes that it is a weekly paper, how to submit advertisements and associated pricing, a notice that the official section of the paper is official information, which every place and official must regard as being equal to law, and an index of the paper’s contents. The privately-owned *Vladivostok* paper presents itself as being more open to engaging in public discourse by opening its printed space open to anyone who will

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<sup>6</sup> For reference, a “typical reporter” was paid 2,400 rubles annually, skilled laborers 300 rubles, doctors between 900 – 3,000 rubles, high-ranking civil servants 6,000 rubles and benefits, and professors 1,500 – 5,500 rubles. (McReynolds 156-7)

submit articles for review; the state *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* is, in its official capacity, representative of the law which cannot be subverted. In 1898 the paper cost 9 rubles for a year with shipment and delivery, a half-year 5 rubles, with a binding subscription 7 rubles; in 1899, the charges remained static, except for military personnel which cost 8 rubles.

Before 1903, there was no “no competent body” for the censorship of the Russian Far Eastern press, and only in July of that year was Vladivostok the first city to house “a full member of the censorship committee” (Bordakov 10). Before this period, censorship of the Russian-language press was “a mess” “arranged from one bureaucrat to another, sometimes carried out by the police,” who slowly gave “approval” before it was sent “to the vice-governor, then their assistants and so on (1).” The “mess” of censorship led to conflicts that prompted complaints to the higher regional and imperial authorities (9). Although the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* was a state-owned newspaper, and therefore offering a state-approved, or censored body of news, it was still regionally-censored, rather than imperially. While the process of censorship isn’t available from examining these papers without clarifying archival sources, it is possible to infer that local concerns weren’t censored or subsumed under printing the priorities of the empire as a whole. Further, the described nature of the poor censorship at the regional level means greater freedom to publish contrarian perspectives, or conversely, self-censorship was prevalent; a record of fines is not readily available to understand how censorship shaped local news narratives, beyond regional censorship being both irregular and an object of scorn by editors.

Over the two years selected for analysis, both papers altered formats and increased the volume of news stories. Comparing the first issues (issued the second week of May 1898) with

the last (issued the second week of September 1899). For the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti*, the change in volume is dramatic. The May, 1898 issue (No. 228) is composed of a short official news section, an unofficial news section that includes city and oblast *khronika*, a review of the Pacific Ocean press, and two long-form articles (raising money to build a monument for a local Russian forester of note, and the state of hunting in the Ussuri river valley), bookended with advertisements. This issue includes a supplement, published several days later with a few official news items, but mostly composed of unofficial news in the form of telegrams divided between internal and external from the Russian Telegraph Agency and advertisements. By September, 1899 (No. 298), the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti*, in addition to its main issue, has three supplements for the week: two supplements with some official news and unofficial news in the form of telegrams and advertisements, and a separate supplement for coverage of the Pacific Ocean press, numbering 38 pages for what used to only be a section numbering a few columns. The No. 298 edition of the paper is exceptional, in that the main issue is mostly dedicated to the Amur-Priamure Agricultural and Manufacturing Exhibition taking place in Khabarovsk, so the regular contents of the main issue have been published in the first supplement for that week. That said, the regular issue-turned-supplement is composed of the same official news items followed by unofficial news, now a single *khronika*, two articles (a subscription for a monument “in honor of righteous Chinese women (*kitaika*), and a marksmanship contest held in the city), telegrams still organized by internal and external sources, and advertisements.

The volume of published items does not increase as drastically in the *Vladivostok* as in the Khabarovsk paper, but there is a marked change in which content is preferred in the

former. In May 1898, in edition No. 19 of that year, the paper begins with an imperial order and a message from His Imperial Highness to the Admiral-General, followed by port orders from the city administration, maritime news, reviews of naval military sciences and a review of the state of regional navigation and shipping for 1897, the *khronika*, correspondence (from Kamen-Rybolov, Khabarovsk (twice), Blagoveshchensk, and Sakhalin), news items from the foreign press (in Japan, Korea, and “blended”) a feuilleton titled “Woman Settler (“*Pereselenka*”), and a short reference section including recent meteorological figures and news. The 1898 No. 19 edition includes two supplements, both including advertisements, Russian Telegraph Agency telegrams (without a marked difference between internal and external news), and reference sections with meteorological figures; the second supplement also includes port orders. The 1899 No. 37 edition excludes any official news, beginning with an article on Gold production in Iakutsk oblast, then the *khronika*, correspondence (from Manchuria, San Francisco, and Khabarovsk), maritime news, and its reference section. Its two supplements containing advertisements and Russian Telegraph agency telegrams; the second supplement also has a reference section.

Over this period, both publications showed increased interest in covering events as framed by the regionality of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk as Asian, Pacific spaces, through the *Vladivostok* publishing a preponderance of correspondence from international, though regional locations (Northeast Asia and Pacific) over the domestic-regional (the Russian Far East), and the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* expanded its coverage of its trans-Pacific publishing competitors. This is evidence of a growing regional identification with, or at least interest in, the region’s “Asianness” among the editorial staff and the reading public. However, this increased

discursive space for Asia and the Pacific still functions to describe “the Other,” even if it shares the same space as the Russians of the Russian Far East. Notions of the local self, of the “values orientation” and local authenticity, can be found in the *khronika* of both newspapers.

Functionally, the *khronika* is a record of local news, typically describing every aspect of life – administrative, political, cultural, scientific, etc. – as it pertains to the local experience, and while measurement of what the local may mean between papers, it is maintained as having a consistent form: a list of short descriptions of events and rumors that are plausibly of interest to the local community. It is the sole source of fact-centric local news, and each paper’s *khronika* is dedicated to its own local life; while each newspaper may print an article discussing the generalized “Yellow Peril,” the *khronika* is the only description of public local life that can articulate the reality, or unreality, of its racial-ideological underpinnings. The local news of the *khronika* can serve as a point of analysis to understand how local agents – media producers and consumers – understand and describe themselves within the discursive orders and ideologies that were deployed in European Russia, and how locals transformed nominally Russian discourses to fit into or transform their perception of local life. Finally, the *khronika* is a useful category to pursue Fairclough’s “hidden determinants and effects” of discourse, as the brevity typical of the *khronika* is shaped by an economy of space that pressures reporters to compress length while still articulating meaning.

The following analysis of selected issues of the *Vladivostok* and *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* between 1898 and 1899 is divided into two sections: notions of “Otherness” in which events between Russian and non-Russian communities occur, categorized as defining “the Other” as “friend or foe,” and general outlines of a racialized hierarchy; and crime, in

which descriptions of criminals and victims are defined. The articles analyzed were selected as including terms that can be classified as being ethnic-cultural or labor descriptors. The ten issues of both papers were selected to evenly distribute analysis over the period under review, and the papers themselves were selected because they are the only newspapers readily available. The twenty-three articles analyzed below are divided into three categories: Russians and the European “Other,” Russians and the Asiatic “Other,” and how crime news stories describe Russian and Chinese perpetrators and victims.

### **5.B Analysis Russians and “the Other”**

Notions of identity according to racial ideology had begun to be employed in the Russian Far East in the 1890s both by officials and in the press. Like in the Caucasus, this ideology placed Russians in a hierarchy in which “Europeanness” was celebrated as innately more civilized than the Asiatic “Other.” By reconstructing how the regional press defined this racial hierarchy will illuminate how conceptions of race affected and were affected by local “value orientations” in informing local authenticity. In the period under review, analysis of the racial hierarchy can be divided between how Russian authors described Russians in contact with other Europeans, and Asians.

A touring German prince made news during his 1898 tour through the Russian Far East (K98.246:X1)<sup>7</sup>. Prince Heinrich is feted by the Khabarovsk military garrison with a “punch.” The *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* describes the party’s program as an inspection of the public gardens, where well-illuminated imperial flags and a monument to Count Muraviev-Amurskii make a positive impression. The news items prioritizes a description of the party as it relates to

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<sup>7</sup> Citation notes are available in the attached appendix.

the military hierarchy: “His Highness” Prince Heinrich and his suite are seated next to the Russian “higher officials” on a dais, below them the officers of the garrison are seated; the servers for the event are not mentioned. The dinner is a series of toasts, in German and French, made by the Governor-General and the Prince for the health of the imperial personages of both represented empires, and the evening is concluded with matching toasts for the armies and navies of both empires. Both toasts are met with Russian “hurrahs” and German “hohs.” German hymns were played during the dinner, which was followed by a Little Russian concert of three parts, consisting of dances and songs, which the news item describes in depth. After the concert, the Prince “descended to the officers and honored many of them with conversation;” in what language is not mentioned. Russian “Europeanness” is expressed linguistically through French at the elite level, the named Governor-General, but through Russian “hurrahs” (to German “hohs”) by a lower class, the faceless officers of the garrison. The *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* prioritizes the good impression the Russians made with their technical proficiency in illuminating the public gardens, but especially Count Muraviev-Amurskii. Generally, the description of the evening celebrates Russianness by equating it with Germany and Europe by presenting their elites as equal, equally civilized, and the Tsarist empire as a whole by presenting its class hierarchy, “higher officials,” “officers,” and “Little Russian performers,” which is also a linguistic hierarchy represented in descending order by French toasts, Russian hurrahs, and Ukrainian folk performance.

In this selection of articles, European “Otherness” is most often represented by Little Russian performances. In December 1898 in Khabarovsk (K99.263:X2), Okrug Military Administration clerks performed an amateur show, of a comedy in three parts: *Pleased*

*Poltavtsy*. The show is described as a “Little Russian play,” with “action alternating with a choir” and “humorous sayings in the Little Russian genre” being typical of the form. The use of Little Russian language was delivered “without reproach” by the actors, and one of the actors played “a true *khokhol*,” a Ukrainian peasant, “however a fright,” was reviewed highly by the paper’s critic. The play tells the story of several pairs of single men and women, through a seemingly complicated series of transactions crossing ethnic-linguistic and class lines, find love and matrimony, barring a single soldier who is willing to give up his beloved to a Polish *pan* (landowner) in exchange for taking the soldier into his home “to the end of his days.” The play itself is followed by songs, anecdotes, verses, and poetry; the entire act was performed by “students, children of the exiles on Sakhalin.” The audience included “the commander of the okrug headquarters, wives of some of the officers, but the intelligentsia public, in general, were very small.” The play shows the rigid ethno-linguistic class hierarchy of Tsarist Ukraine, the inevitability of its reproduction, and the obligations of the classes to one another. The performance is sanctioned by the attending military families, and the noted absence of the intelligentsia is a criticism of their aloofness. Just as the class and ethnic hierarchy and its obligations are reproduced and reinforced in the play, the obligations of charity of the Russian public to the lower-class exile children is reinforced by including them in a subordinate position of public performance.

In January 1899 in Vladivostok (V99.2:X6), a series of performances by the Russian Mrs. Slavina overshadow those of the “Little Russians.” Mrs. Slavina performs the operetta *Kreolka* and later *Hellish Love*, nominally Russian compositions, they are not identified as otherwise, allowing the actress to showcase her “attractive and able singing” and “good acting.” An item of



special attention for the reviewer is the change in hair color for Mrs. Slavina between *Kreolka* (blonde) and *Hellish Love* (brunette). The critic notes that the audience was so impressed with the performances in *Hellish Love*, they in part left the final act, the “Little Ukrainians,” filled the theatre hall “to the brim” to see the director Perovskii. In describing the performances of Mrs. Slavina down to the details of hair color while glossing over the “Little Ukrainians” performance and noting it was not as warmly received by the audience than the presence of the director of the previous performance, places cultural values of Russian performance over Ukrainian performance. The fascination of the critic with Mrs. Slavina’s hair color may be a product of the male gaze but may also speak to the development of stereotypes of physical appearance with inherent personalities within an identity group that is parallel to the development of stereotypes of outside groups.

All three of these news items reproduce linked ethno-linguistic and labor hierarchies, where Western European languages and affluence are equated and valued above Eastern European languages and lower status. Agency, represented by naming and reproducing speech through quotation, are reserved for elites, and for the paper to represent its most European subjects, that is, Germans and Russians speaking in German and French are fully quoted, and only Russian “hurrahs” reproduced during Prince Heinrich’s visit; the “Little Russians” are given a sentence, their performance peripheralized by the audience’s adoration for the director, and voluminous space given to describe Mrs. Slavina; the “Little Ukrainian” performance was carried out by military officers, and the space for their social inferiors, the children of exile-settlers, is given equally diminished space. The Russian Far East press presents a hierarchy of “Europeanness” that is informed by racial ideology that centers “Europeanness” with civilization, reducing

Ukrainians to being represented in the media as performers for Russian social life, which is one of Hall's racial stereotypes. Elite Russians are presented as being equivalent to European elites, naturally and performatively above lower-class Russian officers and intelligentsia and Polish landlords, who are valued above folk Ukrainians, performers and soldiers, who are in turn valued more than the children of exile-settlers. Whenever ethno-linguistic distinctions are made, they include a labor distinction as well.

The discursive trends visible in the Russian Far Eastern press in describing Russians' relationship with Europeans are similar to those in describing their relationship with Asians. Russians are described as being at the top of the cultural hierarchy, above Chinese, who are in turn placed above local indigenous peoples. In May 1898 in Khabarovsk (K98.228:X2), an N. A. Palchevskii of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society presents his census of the Oroch, an indigenous people who were living along the tributaries of the Ussuri river. Palchevskii's census of the Oroch quickly turns to their relationship with local Chinese communities. The Chinese are described as "possessing an influence on the Orochs, and even, to some degree, rule above them, in the chief way, in economic treatment." Chinese laws, local society, and economic efficiency are described, while only Oroch labor practices are described. Palchevskii's census is described as placing Oroch at the bottom of a cultural and labor hierarchy, with the Chinese ranked above them; the former is fit to work for the latter. However, the description of local Chinese law focuses on aspects of corporal punishment, and for all the praise heaped upon Chinese economic efficiency, the majority of their profits are gained from unfairly trading with the Oroch. Palchevskii also notes that there is still space "entirely suitable for [Russian] settlement."

The reporting journalist's description of the expedition itself reproduces the ideological racial hierarchy by placing the Russian geographer as a creator of knowledge in the report, Chinese as his translators, that is, skilled labor, and Oroch, who were charged with hauling supplies on sleighs – unskilled labor. The journey is described negatively, with the lack of infrastructure, harsh climate, and the “terrible atmosphere of the Oroch booth, where the lecturer had overnight lodgings.” This signals the inability of the surveyed peoples to have engaged in economic development suiting a European. Further, Palchevskii's “unfailing companions” were merely “in the presence of his production ... in a population census.” Only Palchevskii is accorded with authorship in a work that was only made possible by the labor of Chinese and Oroch labor. The journalist notes at the end that the lecture “is true, interesting, heard with great interest and was rewarded with generous applause of the listeners.” The Russian audience, if not in reality, then in the journalist's reporting grants popular appeal, and instructs the reader that this report on the Oroch-Chinese relationship is ideologically correct. A short notice in the *Vladivostok* (V99.19:X2) announced that “development of the matter of the Christian enlightenment of the Siberian natives” by the ecclesiastical institute, directly stating the perceived cultural inferiority of local indigenous peoples and the need for enlightenment by European religion.

While local indigenous peoples are marked for enlightenment by Russians, Chinese are marked as enemies. In a news item from the same issue of *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* as Palchevskii's census presentation, the paper celebrates the life of an M. I. Yankovskii, “one of the oldest old-timers of the Ussuri krai” (K98.228:X4). His life is used to review the history of the region, “to his eyes appeared and grew Vladivostok.” The history of the region as told through

Yankovskii's biography can be divided into two parts: fighting local Chinese and regional development. When Yankovskii arrived in the 1870s "homeless Chinese, with rifle in hand, attacked the Russian population. ... Yankovskii took a personal concern in the shooting with the Chinese brigands." Following his fighting days, he "yielded many benefits to our krai" including work in horticulture, apiculture, and ranching. For his activities in the region, the paper calls him an "esteemed pioneer of Russian culture on the shores of the Pacific Ocean." The celebration of Yankovskii's life is to promote not only the economic development he took part in, but also the violence against "itinerant Chinese" and "Chinese brigands." Russianness is progress, "Chineseness" is banditry, the former the inevitable victor over the latter: the actual victory over the attacking Chinese goes unmentioned, as regional insecurity persisted until the end of the Russian Civil War some two decades later.

Months later the Khabarovsk paper notes that twenty-nine Chinese had been repatriated for lacking proper documentation, (K99.263:X5) in which the excised Chinese influence that took place early on in the region's history was transformed into the work of limiting the continuation of Chinese migration. This news item is a clear manifestation of "Yellow Peril" ideology, which identifies the problems of Russian, and European, development having its source in Chinese competition. Much like Yankovskii's combat, the repatriated Chinese were managed by a border guard. The solution to the "Yellow Peril" is framed as being military, removal and then quarantine by way of border control. Another short news items (V99.37:X12) mentions that a telegram was sent from Niuchuang (present Yingkou), a Chinese treaty port, noting that "155 people died." This news prompts no further comment, that the Chinese "Other" is, per Hall's defining aspects

of the racialized “Other,” to be described in terms of mass. These articles represent the inviolability of Chinese, and Asian, inferiority to Russians.

However, different articles position Chinese according to an economic hierarchy that doesn’t necessitate Chineseness as purely cultural or biological. In May 1898, the *Vladivostok* laments the city’s population of beggars, who “are relatively diverse.” (V98.19:X7) The author equates Chinese and Koreans alongside “cripples, singers, elderly men and women, the blind, [and] the legless.” Much like the Chinese dead in Niuchuang, the “homeless need to be counted by the tens, if not hundreds.” While the listed groups are demonized as a public nuisance, special scorn is poured on recent arrivals from Sakhalin, “up to 300 people” who had finished their sentences and are specifically problematized as “entirely without definite skills and with what to be occupied here – is unknown.” The prisoners, much like the Chinese, are problematized as security concerns, and the solution is the local police. This article shows that although the Asiatic “Other” is problematized as an unwanted social element, they are grouped as such because they pose an economic and security concern as economic actors of low value, not for perceived inherent biological and cultural traits. Russian exiles, convicted criminals, are given more space and attention in the article as a problem population because they present no economic value and are a source of insecurity.

Conversely, in May 1899, the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* notes the presence at and participation in the commemoration of the Tsar’s birthday, of the Qing governor of Aigun, the Qing territory directly adjacent to Russian Khabarovsk. Governor Shao’s Chinese rank, “Fudutong” is equated with his Russian counterpart’s, and is welcomed as an equal to the “invited higher military and civilian ranks” to a meal hosted by the Russian Governor-General.

While the visiting Chinese dignitary is not quoted, as the visiting German prince Heinrich had been, Governor Shao is given as much space or more in the article as any Russian other than the Russian Governor-General. This article personalizes a high-ranking Chinese personality in the same manner it does Russian individuals, showing that ideologically, economic value and adherence to discursive norms that support the Tsarist order are valued more than racial ideologies. The *Vladivostok* reported, also in May 1898, that a Japanese vice admiral Hidaka had donated 50 rubles to that city's Committee of the Philanthropic Society (V99.37:X13). His donation is listed alongside various Russian individuals and Russian, German, and French enterprises without further comment. Vice admiral Hidaka's ethnicity is only mentioned in regard that the naval force he leads is Japanese; the German origins of Kunst and Albers goes unremarked. The *Vladivostok* in the same edition (V99.19:X3) also notes that the Priamure military okrug in 1895 had offered a bonus of 500 rubles for officers who had learned Chinese or Japanese. The program had paid out bonuses to five persons, "two for Japanese and three for Chinese," and that the bonuses would continue to be paid out. Further, the article suggests two language textbooks, one of which was published by the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* printers.

### **5.C Analysis Crime in the Russian Far East**

People of Asian origins are only discursively framed as being an Asiatic "Other" when they are also marked as also being of an economically inferior position. For both the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* and the *Vladivostok*, poverty and posing a security threat is problematized more than one's ethnic origin. This is especially pronounced in how both papers cover crime. The following is an analysis of stories covering crimes in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, first with stories

reporting Chinese victims of crime, then Chinese as perpetrators. It is notable that there were no reports of Chinese involvement as perpetrators or victims of crime in the *Priamurskie gubernskie vedomosti* in the period analyzed.

In May 1898 the *Vladivostok* (V98.19:X12) described an “incident, which would appear to be not entirely believable, if we did not receive it from an individual, deserving of absolute trust” in which a Chinese man was shot in his own home in broad daylight by unknown assailants. This daylight robbery was an “occurrence that is entirely new,” and further, the Chinese man lived in a building close to a police establishment. The *Vladivostok* immediately places the blame on “people from Sakhalin island,” Russian exiles. Several months later in January 1899, there is an “entirely enigmatic murder” (V99.2:X2) reported in the neighboring city Nikolsk, in which the wife of a Mr. Stankeev, returned home to find her apartment “a complete pogrom,” that is, their home had been ransacked, but nothing stolen. On the “floor of the kitchen was found the corpse of a *manzi*<sup>8</sup>.” This Chinese victim was burned, “scorched” beyond recognition. The reporter covering the story notes that the Stankeevs employed a Chinese “boy” who had vanished, that “there is no possibility for the time being to establish if the found corpse belongs to him or a different Chinese, maybe one of the robbers.” The report suggests that the employed Chinese “boy” may have been involved, as the ransacked house, with nothing having been stolen, signified that the thieves “were looking for something specific,” knowledge of which they would have had to learn from the Stankeevs or the “boy,” obviously the “boy,” as the reporter places equal probability that the Chinese corpse is the accused “boy” or a robber; there is no suggestion that this crime was committed by a non-Chinese person. In both stories, Chinese men are victims in

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<sup>8</sup> Stephan (73) identifies the Russian transliteration *manzi* from a “colloquial appellation for Manchu.

extraordinarily, literally remarkably violent robbery by unknown assailants. The murder in Vladivostok is blamed on Russian exiles, and in the latter Nikolsk murder, Chinese are blamed. There are two major differences in the cases, as described in the press. The Vladivostok murder was blamed on Sakhalin exiles, because Vladivostok is a port through which Sakhalin exiles return to the continent, and Nikolsk is not, and may explain the different accusations of guilt. Otherwise, the Chinese victims are given sympathy or blame based on their position in the economic hierarchy relative to other individuals in the news report. The Chinese man murdered in Vladivostok is a victim because the paper places guilt on the lower-class Sakhalin exiles; the Chinese “*manzi*,” or “boy” that was murdered, or at least went missing in Nikolsk is a potential perpetrator because the crime took place in the home of a well-respected store employee, who is Russian.

May 1899 was a hectic month for crime in Vladivostok, in which the second edition of the *Vladivostok* reports four separate crimes involving Chinese as victims or perpetrators of crime alone. Further, all of these reports include known perpetrators, and do not allow the reporters to make unsubstantiated claims of guilt. In early May, Sakhalin exiles Tsutskhashvili and Chianov confessed to the “attack on the shop” owned by the Chinese merchant Su-ho-heng in late April. (V99.19:X7) The two men who confessed to the “attack” were part of a larger group which included “four more individuals.” A party of roughly thirty *honghuzi* are arrested upon arrival in Vladivostok, (V99.19:X10) “tied by their own queues, beating their own kinsmen,” seemingly a group of Chinese people who had also just arrived in the city, allegedly related to the *honghuzi* as first cousins. In the most obscure report (V99.19:X6) of the four May 1899 articles claims that a “brigand of the eastern people” wished to kill “two of his compatriots” had been flushed out of



the nearby mountains. This same “brigand of the eastern people” had been accused of “an attempted attack” on a police official which “turned out not to be true, and with mystification” had “already been cleared up.” The last item (V99.19:X11) reports that a Mr. Veling had been killed, the perpetrator turns out to have been his Chinese “boy-servant.” The murderer of the “deceased 28-year-old” was apprehended at the Iman railroad station, located some distance north of Vladivostok. There is a significant lapse in the “facticity” in the reporting between crimes which involved Russians, and those that did not. The news items reporting on the “brigand of the eastern people” and the “party of roughly thirty *honghuzi*” are all vague, lacking names (besides the police official, whose victimhood turned out to be a non-event), unlike the reports regarding Russians, or even the certainty of individuals committing confirmed, discrete actions. This may be representative of either official, police indifference to reporting on non-Russian-involved crimes or that of the reporting newspapers, or both. While the *Vladivostok* assigns guilt to the perpetrators alone in the attacks on Su-ho-heng and Veling, it is only the latter that is given humanizing details, his age, although this could be attributable to the difference in magnitude between assault and murder, the relative freshness of the latter to the former, and relative youth and affluence of the murder victim, as he was able to employ domestic workers. However, while generally continuing the discursive trend of emphasizing guilt according to class rather than race or ethnicity, the reports on the “brigand of the eastern peoples” and the Chinese-*honghuzi* fight employs discourses to highlight their “otherness,” specifically the mention of the tied queues of the arrested *honghuzi* and the “easterness” of the brigand and his desire to murder his “compatriots” that is grounded in racial ideology.

There is only one article that identifies Russians and Chinese cooperating in the perpetration of crime. (V99.37:X8) In September 1899 in Nikolsk-Ussuriiskii, two Russians and six *honghuzi* escaped from the local jail, all of them defendants who had been committed to the watch of an escort. Interestingly, this report blames Russians, not exiles, and *honghuzi*, not Chinese. This directly equalizes criminality with Russianness, whereas there exists a layer between criminality and Chineseness by describing the six escaped criminals as *honghuzi*, though nominally Chinese, belong to the distinctly criminal social class of Chinese.

The Russian Far East of 1898 and 1899, as described by local print media, is rife with contradictions, though consist, with regard to the relations between Russians and “the Other.” Ethno-linguistic and racial hierarchies are reproduced and naturalized in both newspapers, but they often function alongside or feed into labor or political-imperial hierarchies. While Chinese (and Koreans and to a lesser extent, “Little Russians”) are often denigrated, this judgement is only passed on individual Chinese who are economic or political outsiders of Russian society. The local “system of values orientation” places economic and political status separately from one’s racial or ethno-linguistic origins, however much one identity influences the other. The Russian Far East print media produced a local authenticity that was conducive for Russian cooperation with non-Russians, primarily according to a political-imperial hierarchy and to a related but tertiary ethno-linguistic or racial hierarchy.

## **6 Conclusion**

The nineteenth century was a period of dramatic change in Russia. The empire expanded in all directions in both Europe and Asia. Increasingly, ethnic Russians migrated out of European Russia into the empire’s Asian domain, increasing cross-cultural contact. After the

disastrous Crimean War and the internal challenges and opportunities of the Great Reforms, modernization affected every aspect of life, social, economic, and political. These changes were chronicled by newspapers, whose numbers mushroomed in the last half of the century. The new language of the mass print media transformed how Russians understood themselves and the world around them by adopting and adapting the facticity, logical positivist, and universalist language of the European press along with printing technologies themselves. As education and political posts were opened to wider swathes of the Russian population, the language of the news was consumed and circulated with greater frequency and among a larger audience.

These modernizing trends were also deeply felt in the Russian sense of self in relation to “the Other.” Increasing interest in the non-Russian subjects and neighbors of the Tsarist Empire prompted news coverage and investigation. When outsiders to one’s community are described according to discursive framings marking them as “the Other” as a point of departure, this immediately problematizes and centralizes their difference to the observer. Throughout the nineteenth century, there was a slow ideological shift that centralized difference from one’s place in a class hierarchy, dictated by one’s proximity to the Tsar and state, to a racial hierarchy, which was dictated by one’s “Russianness,” a nebulous and poorly-defined concept. This ideological shift was promoted, among other things, by the new print media language of facticity. Proto-scientific discourses lent themselves more to trying to describe non-Russian peoples as “friends or foes” according to different logical positivist, numeric, and universal values. This language is apt, however flawed, for describing masses and volumes of economic production and demographic dispersion, and less so for describing one’s political, personal relationship to the Tsar and the state at large. The language of the press, its facticity,

centralized the problem of race and promoted the articulation and diffusion of ideologies of race, because the very nature of the modern language of mass print media is better suited to trying to describe the world in terms of the social sciences and therefore, race.

The constant security crises beginning in Northeast Asia in the 1890s spurred the use of racial ideology in the Russian press. The period between 1895 and 1905 represents a transformative period for the Russian sense of self as being European, and the people of Northeast Asia as being Asian, and assimilation between the two groups being forever closed to one another, the former identifying the latter with the “Yellow Peril.” While the violence of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion and the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War directly affected Tsarist subjects in the Russian Far East, it also drastically affected European Russian attitudes to the region. The newspaper articles published in the Russian Far East in 1898 and 1899, analyzed above, show that on the eve of the mass violence committed in the Boxer Rebellion by the Qing and Tsarist states and publics against one another, the local news was still more concerned with the position in the class hierarchy and support for the Tsarist empire and social life of Russians and Chinese rather than their perceived race, although traces of racial ideology are also evident. Further research is needed to show what the dimensions of the ideological transformation were, but by 1900, in the moment of crisis, Russians saw themselves more as a people under siege than as subjects of an empire under siege by the “Yellow Peril.” This shift in attitudes of Russians towards themselves and their Northeast Asian neighbors represents an empire-wide social revolution, a visible transformation of Prudkogliad’s “values orientation” that, in a different context, presaged the 1917 Revolution. Russianness centralizing race and ethnicity over the Tsarist political and class hierarchy. Connected with violence by Russians against non-

Russian populations throughout the empire in the same period, this revolution merits as much attention as the political revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

## Appendix Selected Article Translations

The appendix below is organized first by newspaper, publication, and order in which the cited articles appear in the *khronika* section. “K” is for Khabarovsk’s *Priamurie gubernskie vedomosti* and “V” for Vladivostok’s *Vladivostok*. The number immediately following the letter is year published, then issue number, the last number shows the cited article’s specific place within the *khronika*. Therefore, the first item listed below, **K98.228:X2** is in the *Priamurie gubernskie vedomosti*, published in the year 1898, issue 228, the second *khronika* article.

### **K98.228:X2**

On the 7<sup>th</sup> of May, in a general meeting of members of the Priamure Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (I. R. G. O.), occurred the report of N. A. Palchevskii about the census of *inorodtsev* along the tributaries of the Ussuri: the rivers Ima and Vakku.

At the beginning of the report, N. A. Palchevskii cited a short review of the literature about the Tungus tribes/race that live in the Ussuri krai.

The population number, living on the right side of the tributary of the Ussuri: Bikin, Ima, and others, through the given topographical expedition of 1874, determined there were 500 souls, and through the given by I. P. Nadarov, researched, in 1882, the right tributaries of the Ussuri, more than 1500 souls.

In the winter of 1897, the lecturer lead in the Ima river basin for 49 days, carried out a census of the population; through this census the quantity of the population was found to be 948 souls of both genders; under the command of the lecturer were 2 Chinese translators, familiar with spoken Russian and 2 Oroch, carrying sleighs, on which were stacked rations and other things.

The Orochs, currently living in the basin of the river Ima and Vakku, settled there from the coast that calling out was, from one side, the abundance in these places of game and fish, and from the other, in the opinion of the lecturer, the possibility of an easy selling of harvested fish and game to Chinese merchants, living in these places. The day-to-day of the Orochs, living along the Ima river, some are not different from the day-to-day of the Orochs of the Imperial Harbor, as written by V. P. Margaritov.

The Chinese, living along the Ima, are made up of 16 households, with a common ploughed area of 92 desiatins (1 desiatin = 1 hectare) and 7 desiatins of residential land.

For the judgement about the farming of the Chinese, the lecturer, for an example, cited the agricultural figures of the Chinese Ti-ying-gou, living along the Vakku river. Ti-ying-gou possesses 18 workers and cultivates: wheat on 10 desiatins, foxtail millet – 5 desiatins, corn – 4 desiatins, maize – 4 desiatins, gaolian – 3 desiatins, lychee – 3 desiatins, beans – 3 desiatins, shiso – 3 desiatins, barley - .5 desiatins, and gardened – 2 desiatins. The common income, taken by them with their agriculture, nears a sum of 8,000 rubles. These figures, in fact are said, not convey the profitability of their agriculture, and receives from sales to the Orochs of agricultural produce in exchange for furs and ginseng, and moreover the price of the Orochs goods stand in the krai low prices, and the price of the Chinese – is very high.

The chief means for the subsistence of the population, listed by Mr. Palchevskii, is hunting squirrels, sable, ferrets, otters, musk deer, bears, raccoons, lynx, and occasionally, tigers. Hunting occurs from the 1<sup>st</sup> of November to the 15<sup>th</sup> of March and from the 1<sup>st</sup> of August to the first snowfall; animals are hunted, in the chief way, with traps. The Chinese Li-qin-fu, the

main buyer of furs of the Orochs, buys in general, a sum of up to 10,000 rubles, but rescues, likely, 2-4 times more.

Besides hunts and farming, in the visited lectured region, in early spring, still before the appearance of grass in the valleys, Chinese and Orochs dig out fragrant roots “shixing;” in mid-summer, in the deep taiga, search for precious ginseng, and in fall, in the open sandy valleys, search for spicy root “hunqing.”

The seeker of the root, in many places, builds a bark booth, for which is peeled many cedar or other woods, from which is developed dried-roots and beetles.

Hunting fanzi are positioned in narrow valleys or mountain ranges, dressed in coniferous trees. To the largest lures of the hunters consists of deer with antlers; catching deer without antlers, keeping in particular herds, feeding then shrubbery or young elm leaves; the appearance of antlers, deer, typically, are killed.

Besides this, the population of the Ima and Vakka are occupied with the gathering of cedar nuts, quick resin to patch river boats and dinghies.

The Chinese population is made up of its own collective, which possesses its own elected court and apportioned desiatins, chosen every three years; the court is chosen, typically, from respected elders.

The Chinese, as more cultured, possess an influence on the Orochs, and even, to some degree, rule above them, in the chief way, in economic treatment. We are citing the quoted N. A. Palchevskii text of laws, which possesses the application among the population of the Ima and Vakku rivers.

“Guang-xu, 22 years old. February 13<sup>th</sup>. Law of the community administration.

§ 1. Card games for money is allowed from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> of April, and food – from the 15<sup>th</sup> of August to the 15<sup>th</sup> of March. In the last event, winning pays by spirit and together eat; the host should sell all requested players in money.

For a game to the food of the host is to be exposed a fine of 1 ox and 15 puds (1 pud = 16.3807 kg) of flour.

§ 2. For the sale of sable not to one’s own cai-tong (that is, the creditor), guilty are subject to 40 (blows) with a rod and restitution of the sable to its owner.

§ 3. For unsuccessful harvesting of ginseng, to one’s own cai-tong the guilty is subject to 40 (blows) with a rod and banishment from Ima.

§ 4. For concealing from the cai-tong the purchase of antlers – 40 blows.

§ 5. Passersby possessing the right to live in any fanzi for 3 days for free, and then is obliged to pay 40 kopecks, and for the first three days of the new year, 5 rubles.

§ 6. For a strike and argument 40 blows and 7 puds of provisions.

§ 7. Wounded persons by gun or knife should be located under the supervision of the da-ye (the court) for 18 days and if they die, that the guilty are subject to be exposed to being buried alive.

§ 8. For fraud – 40 blows

§ 9. A member of a workshop, stolen a thing, should be quickly arrested and shown in court for a punishment of 40 blows and 13 puds of flour.

§ 10. Orochs obliged to carry *manzi* on boats for following rates for 2 people with 30 puds of cargo:

To Chengza (85 versts from the mouth of the Ima river) 18 rubles

-	Miao-ling	(120 - )	24 rubles
-	Kalatong	(144 - )	30 rubles
To fanzi of	Li-qing-fu	(280 - )	42 rubles
To	Xidatong	(389 - )	72 rubles

§ 11. For the exchange of the steelyard balance – 20 blows and 7 puds of provisions

§ 12. For theft in a Chinese fanzi – 40 blows and banishment from Ima

§ 13. For the theft in the booth – 40 blows

§ 14. For arguing because of a banished dog – 40 blows

§ 15. For the purchase of goods of large shipments of furs secretly from the cai-tong – 40 blows and return of the furs to its owner.

§ 16. A worker or part-owners (“kulashir”) for the abandonment of the owner earlier than 1 year, not only will not receive anything, but is obliged to remunerate the owner.

§ 17. For a vain calling of the community the da-ye is obliged to compensate financial expenditures.

§ 18. For tardy completion of related customs (kkhetu) – to the worker 40 blows and the owner – 13 puds of provisions of a fine.

§ 19. A Chinese, not returning to the basin (da-ye? Da-ze?) selected rifle to the 15<sup>th</sup> of April, will be subject to a fine.

§ 20. For residence of more than three days, unknown to the host, the visiting person should appear to a guarantor, which, however, not ridding of the owner from the responsibility for the offense of those residing there.

§ 21. Each workshop is obliged to possess of a guide to pay 4 rubles beyond the interest of the catch.

Those at fault of these are placed on the laps of a time of combustion “xiang” (burning candles from carrion, .5 arshins long [1 arshin = 1 yard]), and besides this, for one guilty of a fine

For 2 guilts and a fine, and blows

- 3 - blows

- 4 - blows

- 5 - blows

- 6 - blows

Those subject to court clerk (“zong-li”) is placed in the laps for a time of three xiang and fined one ox.

Members of the Chinese community are united and live amicably, to that promotes customs of connected brotherhood, which consists in the writing on red paper of names of persons, of those making up the union, and a vow before idols in the establishment between allies with the obligation of mutual affection, trust, and help.

The Chinese, settled along the Ima and Vakka, judging by the report of the lecturer, live prosperously, that rely on, chiefly, the comparative prosperity of the non-Russian population, relying on the abundance of hunting of the grounds and, besides this, the Chinese of large importance the profit of extraction from the ground, entirely suitable for plowing and sowing; there is much convenient land in the Iman basin and Vakka; along the Vakka the lecturer found 9,150 desiatins and along the Iman 1194 desiatins; these figures, however, do not exhaust all reserves suitable for settlement of the land the lecturer assumes, that in the irrigated areas by



the mentioned rivers places are to be found in some time more soil, entirely suitable for settlement. The population census was carried out by Mr. Palchevskii from the beginning of January through the 1<sup>st</sup> of March.

Travelling through dwellings of the Orochs and Chinese was linked with larger difficulties, as the roads were not arrived to travel through deeply-packed snow, tied up almost to the chest, going, sometimes to the flow of an hour, no more than 300 sazhen (sazhen = 2.1336 meters). Frost, snowstorms, insufficiency in snow goods and poor nutrition generally, a terrible atmosphere of the Oroch booth, where the lecturer had overnight lodgings or the cold penetrating the overnight lodgings in the open wind, under the protection of linen tents, there the unfailing companions of N. A. Palchevskii were in the presence of the production by him, in the flow of 49 days, a population census along the Ima and Vakku rivers.

The lecture of Mr. Palchevskii, is true, interesting, heard with great interest and was rewarded with generous applause of the listeners.

#### **K98.228:X4**

To Khabarovsk has arrived, in a short time, news in our krai of the horse breeder M. I. Yankovskii. Mr. Yankovskii – one of the oldest old-timers of the Ussuri krai, settled on Askold island still at the beginning of the 1870s. To his eyes appeared and grew Vladivostok; he remembers of the time, when in the surroundings of Vladivostok wandered itinerant Chinese, and with a rifle in hand, attacked the Russian population.

Besides this, M. I. Yankovskii accepted a personal concern in the shooting with the Chinese brigands, attacking his farm, founded in 1877, at the mouth of the Sedemy river, on the shores of the Amur estuary. Short, fragmented stories of Mikhail Ivanovich about the not-distant past of Vladivostok to this degree of interest, that we would consider for a special honor, if M. I. would not refuse to report to us his most favorite stories of course and in the entire first steps of Russian culture of the Ussuri krai.

We do not consider it superfluous to add, that Mr. Yankovskii to have yielded many benefits to our krai, researching, on the experience, the questions of horticulture, apiculture, and ranching on the shores of the Amur estuary.

Many of his beneficial undertakings, however, beyond the climatory conditions and the fog mainly, did not lead to the surroundings of Vladivostok, but, for that, to have served with the impulse to development in the Ussuri krai of much outgrown agriculture.

M. I. Yankovskii stopped at horse breeding and, leading this matter for already many years, in recent time, approached excellent results and possess already 500 horses and has begun to accept to his own factory personal profit.

In the most recent issues calculations to invest more in similar reports about the activities of esteemed pioneers of Russian culture on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, M. I. Yankovskii.

#### **K98.246:X1**

On September 5<sup>th</sup>, Prince Heinrich was invited to an honorable punch, organized in the quarters of the military assembly of the officers of the garrison; his royal highness was pleased to accept the invitation.

At 9 in the evening, from the home of the Governor-General, the prince, accompanied by the chief administrator of the krai, proceeded on foot to the public garden, which there was flying the Russian and German flags, illuminated: by oil lamps, Chinese lamps, and Bengali fires (sparklers); especially effectively lit was the monument to Count Muraviev-Amurskii; along the path of movement of his highness stood officers of the Khabarovsk garrison. The illumination having caught this fancy, the Prince proceeded to the military assembly.

In the hall of the assembly, on the dais, was installed an honorable table for his highness, of individuals his suite and of the higher officials; perpendicular to this table was placed two long tables, behind which were seated officers.

When everyone was seated at the table, the governor-general made a toast for the Emperor and Empress of Germany, met by present cries of "hurrah" and "hoh;" the music played was German hymns. In answer to the toast of the Governor-General, Prince Heinrich answered with a toast, in German, for our Lord Emperor and Lady Empress, meeting delighted cries of "hurrah" and the hymn "God, protect the Tsar;" then, after a toast for the Prince's health, followed this toast in French, for the prosperity of the krai and for the health of its chief administrator.

A concert began with dancers from the Little Russian troupe of Miroslavskii; after the first part of the concert, the Prince descended to the officers and honored many of them with conversation.

At the end of the Little Russian concert, Prince Heinrich offered a toast for the Russian army and fleet, and moreover, drank a glass to the bottom, and broke it (?); the Governor-General, in answer to his majesty's toast, offered a toast to the health of the Germany army and fleet.

The celebration ended at 11:30 in the evening with toasts to the prince, who departed to his room, accompanied by "hurrahs" of the officers of the Khabarovsk garrison.

The concert of the Little Russians consisted of the following program: *Part I*: the entire troupe was performing the who song of the vespers and holy fortune-telling (?); at the end, was danced the "Hopak;" in *Part II* was song: "Hey, at the meadow," the Little Russian romance "Gandzya," "Hey, tell me of my mother," a quartet "Howl this thigh (?)," a duet "Troublemakers" and the good song "Greek woman;" In *Part III* was performed: "Sun of Nyzenko," "Oh, I've gone to the music," "Nightingale," "Solokha" and "Oh over the mountain."

### **K99.263:X2**

On the 27th of December 1898, the clerks of the Okrug Military Administration (mainly of the okrug headquarters and okrug intendants), with the permission of the commander, in the canteen of the 10<sup>th</sup> E. S. (Eastern Siberian) Line Battalion, gave a free amateur show. Presented was a comedy in three parts, "Pleased Poltavtsy" (written by Miroslavskii).

The plot of the play is ingenious. A certain Polish landowner (*pan*, derogatory), Vozny, evidently, an official person, already of some age and constantly unhappy in the attainment of matrimonial goals, match-making, thanks to a petition of marital business, forever drunk, but the cunning of a simple Ukrainian girl (*khokhol*, derogatory) Rudy, young Galya, the daughter of the widow Karpenchikha, who has given her word to marry another. The match-maker, of course, does not succeed, and Rudy, to who is promised for the successful outcome of the matter a reward, in the form of two bulls, falling to the happy idea to make a match to Vozny

widow Terpely. In this, to each turn, there is their own “beloved” – the soldier Ivan Ryaboy, of who the widow expects is already 20 years old. Never the less, to Rudy succeeds to beckon at Terpelii’s an agreement to marry Vozny. Almost in the same time, it is definitely decided in the request about the marriage of Galya, and so the daughter of Terpelii, Nataalka. The three happy pairs are gathering already happily to celebrate their betrothal, so that there is entirely nothing awaiting to appear, to receive the “honest” soldier Iv. Ryaboy; the widow hesitates; Vozny evidently gathers, as such it was earlier, “through innate kindness,” abandons the bride, but Ryaboy, not desiring to destroy the happiness of his beloved with another, himself decided the question, abandoning all rights to the widow. To the reward for this independent act, Vozny gives Ryaboy a vow to take him to his home after the wedding at the home, where he will live to the end of his days. The matter, in such a way, is satisfying to the widow and Rudy, to who all appears the pledged bulls.

The play is interspersed with humorous sayings in the Little Russian genre; there are many curious places, for example, the original scene explained in the love of Vozny with Galya, upsetting the arrival of the entire crowd of guys. Such in the majority of the Little Russian play, the action alternates with a choir.

The comedy, supplied under the direction of the clerk Mokritskii, needs to be confessed, was led to excel, to that success of a spectacle much promoted without reproach of the Little Ukrainian language, in which was expressed the acting individuals. Especially good were the choirs, prepared to perform under the leadership of the clerk Bloshenko; the clean and high tenor stood out. The women’s’ roles, filled by men, were carried out truly, especially the role of the widow Terpelii was realized as truthfully, that, without exaggeration is possible to say, that the majority of the audience easily was able to call to the role of the widow not a man, but a woman. Rudy was good, a true khokhol, however a fright, but not letting go for a minute from view of his interest. Especially good was the pan Vozny (Mokritskii). The remaining acting personalities in full measure satisfied the demands of the audience, the roles were well-known and, generally, evidently, honestly carried out their task.

In the diversion was sung a quartet of songs: “Bellows the Thigh of the Dnibr Wide” (???). After this followed anecdotes, verses, and poetry.

At the spectacle the commander of the okrug headquarters was present, women of some of the officers, but the intelligent public, in general, were very small.

In the entre act was played choir music, almost all was composed of students, children of the exiles on Sakhalin.

#### **K99.263:X5**

On the 4<sup>th</sup> of January was sent to the border of China, across the Poltavskii Border Guard, 29 Chinese, held in Khabarovsk for lacking documents.

#### **K99.280:X2**

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, during the occurrence of the high solemn birthday of the Lord Emperor, in the Cathedral of the Assumption was committed the solemn liturgy, and after there were prayers for the health and longevity of the Lord Emperor.

In the church service there was present the Governor-General, his assistant and other leading personalities, and besides all the officers of the Khabarovsk garrison and the civil service

bureaucrats of all institutions. At the proclamation of the longevity of the Lord Emperor, was carried out the set gun fire.

At the conclusion of the service, there was a parade of the units from the Khabarovsk garrison; the parade was commanded by the commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Line Battalion.

The chief administrator of the krai, at the sounds of the Preobrazhenskii march, went around, greeting, the front of the soldiers, after this acclaimed a toast to the Lord Emperor, covering from all sides "hurrahs" of the soldiers and the sounds of the national hymn.

The soldiers having passed through the ceremonial march, the commander of the soldiers praised all members for the excellent passing.

At the conclusion of the parade, the civil servants of the diplomatic office during the Governor-Generalship of Ya. Lyutish, presented the administration of the krai with the appointed Aigun Fudutun (governor) Shao, who had arrived in Khabarovsk for this goal.

At noon, the Governor-General's was breakfast, at which there was invited the higher military and civilian ranks, and also the Aigun Fudutong Shao.

#### **V98.19:X7**

Recently in the city exceptionally wide measures have been taken by beggars, especially on the streets of Semenovskii field. Beggars of the public are relatively diverse. This and the cripples (or through an extreme measure giving themselves as such) singers, elderly men and women, the blind, legless, Chinese, Koreans, and so on. Besides this there the Semenovskii field meets a mass of vagabonds, loafing about without clear business on the streets from dive to dive. These homeless need to be counted by the tens, if not hundreds. Now there is believed to be still more, that since on the ship *Yaroslav* arrived here from Sakhalin island up to 300 people having finished a term of exile. Many of them, as they say, are entirely without definite skills and with what to be occupied here – is unknown. In all incidences that would follow the local police will turn their attention to these arriving and maintain them of which image in their view of themselves.

#### **V98.19:X12**

It has been told to us about the following incident, which would be able to appear to be not entirely believable, if we did not receive it from an individual, deserving of absolute trust.

About 6 or 7 days ago, during the light of day, in rooms occupied by Chinese located in a building near the police, there was stolen some unknown people and began to gather different belongings, located in the apartment. When the Chinese began to resist, one of them was shot. The burglar, taken what was possible, fled. This burglar, during the light of day, is an occurrence that is entirely new. Not practicing if this not leisure time to arrive on the ship *Freedom* people from Sakhalin Island?

#### **V99.2:X2**

In Nikolsk there has again been an entirely enigmatic murder. On holidays the wife of one of the men working in the Langelite store, Mr. Stankeev, returned home to find in her apartment a complete pogrom; all the things in the drawers, cabinets, and tables appeared broken open, things strewn about and in disarray, but nothing was stolen, the thieves were looking for something specific. On the floor of the kitchen was found the corpse of a *manzi*, set

on fire by some evil-doers and before this scorching, that there is no possibility to recover his identity. The quarters remained in the care of the boy (note: slur) Chinese, who vanished and there is no possibility for the time being to establish to if the found corpse belong to him or a different Chinese, maybe one of the robbers. Mrs. Stankeva remained from 5 to 7 p.m., such that the savage murder is entirely almost all day. The investigation is ongoing.

#### **V99.2:X6**

In the past week, it is possible to say, there were two benefits for Mrs. Slavina.

In the theater the name day of the artist was chosen a song, in which he wants to appear all of his strengths, readers bringing wreaths, gifts and ovations... success involuntarily swells up.

Without a doubt the artist for his own benefit Mrs. Slavina chose the operetta "Kreolka" and we gathered ourselves to give a response about this spectacle. We wanted to say about this success, which had a beneficiary, wanted to say about these loud ovations and offerings, which were received by the artists, wanted to describe her impressive costume and to do a short description concerning that the "Kreolka" appeared blonde, but after this success, which the artist has in the means to Wednesday in "Hellish Love," we find, that the reality of her benefit was not on Monday, and on Wednesday and we may only repeat that, which the artist already hear many times, - we shortly say – *bravo Slavina!*

Until now we believed in her attractive and able singing, but in "Hellish Love" she still appeared herself and good acting, flexible, gracefully and ably carrying the scene and mimicking the expression of a struggle of emotions... Incidentally we note, that the brunette-Slavina is no less interesting in the scene of the blonde-Slavina and her not following to fear to step forth in this guise.

The tenor Gorskii all more and more won the sympathy of the public; abandoning some of his operatic style usefully, he only wins, moving in his own performance of a sufficient play.

The decorative part of the performance of the operetta, taken in the attention of the uncomfortable and narrow scenes, not abandoning to desire better; the decorator did everything possible for the acquisition of effects, of needs at the performance of this operetta. Mr. Belov was called by the public several times, called out the director Perovskii. Despite the fact that the "Little Russians" were the last spectacle, diverting much of the public in the theatre hall Perovskii was to the brim. The spectacle had a stand out success and daringly possible to advise Mr. Perovskii to return another time to "Hellish Love," in order to give the possibility to see it and with that, who did not have the chance to be there on that day.

We are not inclined to take an interest, but what is good – is good.

On Friday the 15<sup>th</sup> of January, to the benefit of Mrs. Chernyavskii is to be staged the drama "Maternal(?) Benediction," in which Mrs. Slavina is to perform in a dramatic role. This will be a new trial of strength of the attractive actress, from which she is believably to appear the victor.

#### **V99.19:X3**

By a military order of the Priamure military okrug of 1895 No. 132 was established the payment of a bonus of 500 rubles, for successfully learning the Chinese or Japanese languages.

Accepted, in view of experience, this measure appears fully successful and in the flow of three years has given out five bonuses: two for Japanese and three for Chinese.

In view of this, the commander of the military okrug ordered to declare, that in the future an order of a payment of bonuses will remain as before.

The best guidance for familiarization with Chinese may be to serve the book of Mr. Dobrovidov "A Fellow Traveler through Manchuria," printing now in two editions in the printing house of the *Priamurskie Vedomosti*, where it is being sold.\* (\* Printing will finished on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July of this year.)

For the study of Japanese is possible to point to the "Russo-Japanese dictionary" by Mr. Itu, sold in Japan and of many foreign guidance.

The declaration about the officers, desiring to undergo testing in language knowledge, should enter the headquarters of the okrug according to order, not wasting time.

Behind all inquiries and instructions, concerning with the study of the Chinese or Japanese languages, officers should immediately turn to the reporting office of the okrug headquarters.

#### **V99.19:X6**

About the presence in the city of a brigand of the eastern persons, who had the intention to kill here two of his compatriots, we are able to report, that on the week before last he was caught in the forest in the mountains near the city. There was organized a flushing out. His attempt on the assistant of the police chief Batarevich turned out to be not true, and with mystification, has already been cleared up.

#### **V99.19:X7**

On April 26<sup>th</sup> near the Matroska peasant settlement in the mountains there was detained by the city 4<sup>th</sup> allotment of Kovalevii exile-settlers on Sakhalin Tsutskhashvili, accused in the attack on the shop on the corner of Pologoi and Aleuts streets of the Chinese Su-ho-heng. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of May at 10 a.m. on Peking street the police supervisors of the 4<sup>th</sup> allotment of Mr. Antropov arrested the son of the settler Faddei Chianov, who was suspected in the attack on the shop with Tsutskhashvili; at the drawing up of the protocol he did not confess, the protocol was he was transferred to the city court investigator of the 1<sup>st</sup> allotment Bako, to who at questioning confessed and indicated still four more individuals, who took part in the attack.

#### **V99.19:X10**

It has been reported to us, that the past week there arrived in the city some Chinese, who were first cousins with recognized *honghuzi*, about which they reported to the police. On the ship or sooner on the barge arrived the *honghuzi*, to us is unknown. Their party was roughly 30 people, tied by their own queues, beating their own kinsmen, seen following in the jail.

#### **V99.19:X11**

It's said, that through all signs the murder of Veling, was done entirely by Chinese, and that this turns out to be true the boy-servant of the deceased 28-year-old, was searched for and caught at the Iman station.

**V99.37:X8**

In Nikolsk-Ussuriiskii from the local jail (there is no prison there), escaped in the morning of September 1<sup>st</sup> six *honghuzi* and two Russians. All of them were defendants. The escapees were committed to the watch of an escort.

**V99.37:X12**

By telegram from General Subbotich and the consul Ostroverkhov from September 8<sup>th</sup>, from the fourth and seventh in Niuchuang, 155 people died.

**V99.37:X13**

During August of this year there was given to the Committee of the Philanthropic Society for the organization of a lottery-raffle:

Nos of receipts

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| 1) From the vice admiral of the Japanese squadron Hidaka                                | 50 rubles  |
| 2) From the show, given by the artists of troupe of Mr. Iavorskato and Mr. Miroslavskii | 250 rubles |
| 3) From Mrs. Labe   | 25 rubles  |
| 4) From Mrs. Ya. L. Semenova  | 100 rubles |
| 5) From the Kunst and Albers trading house  | 300 rubles |
| 6) From the Zenzinoia trading house   | goods      |
| 7) From the trusted Johann Langelite Mr. Tolla  | goods      |
| 8) From the French store  | goods      |
| 9) From the Piankov and Brothers trading house  | 100 rubles |
| And wines worth   | 50 rubles  |
| 10) From Mr. Pereialov  | 100 rubles |

Of all the donations the Committee of the Society asks to accept deep thanks for the contribution to the success of the raffle.

Donations continue to be accepted to the Military Governor's building at the main entrance, from 11 to 1 during the day.

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